The Corporate and Securities Adviser, The Public Interest, and Professional Ethics by Lorne, Simon M.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 76 Issue 3 
1978 
The Corporate and Securities Adviser, The Public Interest, and 
Professional Ethics 
Simon M. Lorne 
University of Pennsylvania 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, and the Legal Profession 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Simon M. Lorne, The Corporate and Securities Adviser, The Public Interest, and Professional Ethics, 76 
MICH. L. REV. 423 (1978). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol76/iss3/2 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
THE CORPORATE AND SECURITIES 
ADVISER, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, AND 
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 
Simon M Lorne 
INTRODUCTION . . • • . • • • • . • . . • . . • • • • • • . . . 425 
I. WHERE WE WERE . • • • . • • . . . • . • . . • . . • . 429 
A. The Historical Role of the Lawyer and His Ethics 429 
B. The Code of Professional Responsibility . . . . . . 434 
1. The Nature of the Client. . . . . . . . . . . . 436 
2. The Lawyer Owes a Client Undivided Loyalty 438 
3. The .Duty To Be Free from Influence . . . . . . 439 
4. · There Is a Strong Ethical Obligation To Preserve 
Confidences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 440 
5. Final .Decisions Are the Province of the Client, Not 
the Lawyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 441 
6. A Lawyer May Not, However, Participate in or 
Countenance Fraud or Other Illegal Activity . . 441 
JI. CHANGES IN THE ROLE . . • • • . • • • . • . 445 
A. The Audit Letter Response Settlement . . 446 
1. The .Dispute . . . . . 446 
2. The Settlement . . . . . . . 450 
B. The SEC Litigation . . . . . . 4~~ 
1. The Acceptance of Clients . 458 
2. Representational Ethics . . 459 
3. Limitation of Engagements . . . . . . 459 
4. .Disclosure and Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . 460 
5. The Locus of .Decisionmaking Authority. . . . 462 
C. Implications of the SEC Litigation . . . . . . . . 463 
III. THE CORPORATE LEGAL ADVISER'S ENVIRONMENT • 464 
IV. RATIONAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FUTURE • • • 466 
A. A Comparison of the Alternatives . . . . . . . . 466 
B. An Evaluation. . . . .- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 468 
1. The Lawyer as Accountant. . . . . . . . . . 469 
2. The Lawyer as Confidant . . . . . . . . . . 472 
3. The Critical Additional Factor. . . 414 
V. THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL AoVISORIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY • • • • . • • • . . • . • • 476 
423 
424 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 76:423 
A. Who Speaks for the Client? . . . 477 
B. The Acceptance of Representation 479 
I. The Acceptance of Clients . . 479 
2. Acceptance of Limited Engagements. 482 
C. Confidentiality, .Decisionmaking, and Withdrawal 486 
. D. Avoidance of Conflicting Roles . . . . . . . . . . . 490 
VJ. CONCLUSION-THE MECHANICS OF DECISION AND IMPLE-
MENTATION . . . . • . • • . . • . • , . • . • • • , • • • 495 
THE CORPORATE AND SECURITIES 
ADVISER, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, AND 
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 
Simon M. Lorne* 
"There is, perhaps, no profession, tifier that ef the sacred ministry, in 
which . . . morality is more imperatively necessary than that ef the law. 
There is certainly. . . no prefession in which so many temptations beset 
the path to swerve from the line ef strict duty and propriety . . . . " 
The Hon. George Sharswood 
INTRODUCTION 
The modem lawyer can barely be recognized as the descendant 
of the law students at the University of Pennsylvania to whom Judge 
Sharswood delivered his lectures in 1854. The lawyer's offices, func-
tions, and clients have been altered fundamentally by rapid develop-
ments in transportation, communications, and the law itself. Despite 
those changes, however, the specific standards that ostensibly govern 
the modem lawyer's behavior, delineated in the Code of Professional 
Responsibility (Code), are unquestionably the natural offspring of 
Judge Sharswood's work. The changes in the world to which it is 
addressed have had minimal impact on the Code itself. 
In the abstract, of course, there may be no reason for change. Our 
basic notions of morality do not necessarily shift over time. Murder, 
robbery, and the like remain as criminal today as they were in 1854, 
and properly so. The Code, however, is not a compilation of abstract 
principles, but is rather a statement of propriety as applied to the 
practice of the legal profession. That substantial changes have oc-
curred in the nature of that practice should therefore suggest the 
need for a reappraisal of the Code's precepts. This Article will ad-
dress one area in which th~t need is particularly apparent, the emer-
gence of the lawyer who functions primarily as an adviser rather 
than in the traditional role of advocate. This development, attended 
by the growth of the corporate client and of the large law firm, has 
• Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania; Acting Director, 
Center for the Study of Financial Institutions. A.B. 1967, Occidental College; J.D. 1970, The 
University of Michigan. 
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outstripped the ability of the present Code to provide meaningful 
ethical guidance to the modem corporate attorney. 
The need for organized reappraisal becomes even more apparent 
when it is recognized that in its absence the courts, regulatory agen-
cies, and even segments of the bar and other professions have devel-
oped, on a relatively haphazard basis, new concepts of the duties and 
responsibilities of corporate advisers. It is the thesis of this Article 
that we, as a society, need to make deliberate decisions about the 
proper role of the corporate adviser, and, when that function has 
been defined, to develop a structure within which it can be per-
formed. As the Article makes clear, the logical choices involve what 
might be described as either revolutionary change or reactionary 
change. That is, the current trends should either be accelerated or 
reversed; the present situation is intolerable. While the author will 
contend that the case for shifting into reverse is more persuasive, 
getting into a gear, and out of the current "neutral drift," is probably 
more important than the selection of the appropriate gear. 
The specific question to which much of this Article is addressed 
is whether the corporate adviser's present-or at least recently past-
role as confidant of management, exercising independent judgment 
and moral suasion to affect client behavior, should be changed, as it 
is now changing, to a function autonomous1 of management, with 
primary loyalty to the general public. The development of that pub-
lic function is probably most apparent in the treatment of securities 
lawyers, and it is upon them that the Article will focus. It should be 
obvious, however, that the factors influencing the role of the securi-
ties law adviser eventually will also affect the tax lawyer, the anti-
trust adviser, the estate planner, and all other practitioners whose 
function is advisory rather than adversary in nature. Whatever role it 
is that we desire corporate advisers to fill, there is a desperate need 
for a new Code to reflect their appropriate duties; that, too, is given 
attention in this Article. 
The question of proper behavior for the lawyer arises primarily 
in the context of a conflict between the goals and desires of the law-
yer's client, as articulated by its management, and the broader public 
interest. That is, if the client proposes behavior that may be charac-
terized as antisocial, what is the duty of the lawyer? Does the lawyer 
1. The word "independent" would be, in many respects, more appropriate than the word 
"autonomous" for the purposes of this Article. I use autonomous, however, to avoid confusion 
with the sense of "independence" that the traditional lawyer is required to maintain. See ABA 
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON No. 5 and the Ethical Considerations there-
under (1977) [hereinafter cited as CODE]. 
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have an obligation to assert the public interest, and, if so, under what 
circumstances is it superseded by responsibilities to the client? Since 
neither the duty to public nor the duty to client can simply be dis-
carded, the inquiry turns first to identifying the extent to which the 
duties are irreconcilable, and, second, to identifying the associated 
costs of preferring one to the other. This issue must certainly be ad-
dressed against a background of an increasing societal emphasis on 
the public nature of the corporate lawyer's responsibilities. 
Some aspects of the corporate adviser's changing function al-
ready have been the subject of fairly intense debate. To date, how-
ever, that debate has not been fruitful, for the parties to it have 
tended to focus attention on relatively narrow issues, and neither 
side has been truly responsive to the other. Specifically, the publicity 
attending the filing of the complaint by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (hereinafter referred to as the SEC or the Commission) 
in the National Student Marketing2 case generated considerable heat, 
though much less light, concerning the lawyer's obligation to "tum 
in" or "squeal on" the client. Those supporting the SEC's general 
position emphasized the need for lawyers to protect the public and 
the importance of lawyer involvement for the effective operation. of 
the securities laws.3 The opposition invariably stressed the potential 
destruction of the client's willingness to impart confidences to attor-
neys.4 Neither side confronted the other except to claim that "11).y 
concern is more important" or, occasionally, to assert that the two 
views were not really incompatible and that the argument was not 
really that important.5 
Meanwhile, with considerably less attention to the implications 
for the corporate lawyer, the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) and the American Bar Association' (ABA) 
reached a settlement of a substantial dispute, significant cases and 
administrative proceedings against lawyers were filed or decided 
and, recently, one of the major law firm defendants in National Stu-
dent Marketing settled that case through adoption of specified inter-
nal procedures. Though each of those developments evidences that 
2. Complaint, SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] 
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 93,360 (D.D.C. 1972). 
3. See, e.g., Garrett, New .Directions in Professional Responsibility, 29 Bus. LAW. 7, 10-12 
(1974). See also SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 536 (2d Cir. 1973); Corporate Govern-
ance-New Heat on Outside .Directors?, FORBES, Oct. I, 1977, at 33 (interview with present 
chairman of the SEC, Harold M. Williams). 
4. See, e.g., Daley & Karmel, Attorneys' Responsibilities: Adversaries at the Bar of the SEC, 
24 EMORY L.J. 747 (1975). 
5. See Sommer, Introduction, Symposium: Eeforcement of the Federal Securit(es Laws, 24 
EMORY L.J. 557, 563-66 (1975). 
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the role of the corporate lawyer is, indeed, shifting, it is clear that 
they have not emerged from a thoroughgoing consideration of the 
corporate adviser's social function. 
This Article examines these developments with a view to the en-
vironment within which the corporate legal adviser works and to the 
alternative roles such lawyers might logically fill. Building upon that 
analysis, the Article proposes how best to select the role and to create 
the environment in which the corporate lawyer can reasonably fulfill 
societal expectations. Before undertaking that analysis, however, it 
may be useful, in view of the confusion surrounding many of the 
issues in this area, to make several preliminary observations. 
Liability of Lawyers Is Not the Issue. Many analyses of issues 
such as those discussed in this Article tend sooner or later to focus on 
the question ''when is the lawyer liable?" That is, of course, a legiti-
mate approach, and the results of such analyses are obviously impor-
tant to members of the profession. But to focus upon that question 
creates the danger that historical roles will be viewed as unchange-
able, which, of course, they are not. That is, when the lawyer asks for 
what actions a lawyer should be liable, the unavoidable inclination is 
to personalize the question: "Should I be held liable if I do that?" 
And the answer, then, tends to assume the lawyer's historical role: 
"No (or yes), because I have always viewed my role as being_,, 
Thus, notwithstanding the obvious relationship between establishing 
standards for lawyers and the imposition of liability when they are 
not met, this Article focuses solely on what should be the role of the 
corporate adviser, and not on what are the appropriate standards of 
liability. 
There Will Always Be Pressure To Alleviate the Visible Harm. 
There is an inevitable emotional desire to eliminate that harm which 
is seen. As a result, if it is determined-as this Article suggests it 
should be-that confidentiality is of societal value and that the role 
of the lawyer should not change, the pressure for such change will 
not simply disappear. If we uphold confidentiality as a value, we 
also guarantee that there will be future cases in which investors will 
lose money, or taxes will not be paid, or other social harm will occur 
that could have been prevented if a lawyer had breached a confi-
dence. But though such losses are, in one sense, the inherent cost of 
confidentiality, a disclosure obligation will eliminate them only until 
the requirement becomes generally known and clients stop confiding 
jn their lawyers. Thus, society protects confidentiality in situations 
such as where the client confesses guilt to the lawyer because of its 
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recognition that a disclosure requirement would have only short-
term benefits while the loss of confidentiality would be permanent. 
However, as long as there is an emotional environment against 
confidentiality, there will be courts that in some circumstances will 
rule with the emotional pressure. Consequently, a statutory mandate 
is probably the only means by which the confidentiality principle 
can be effectively safeguarded. 
The Individual Lawyer Cannot Act Alone. One of the reasons that 
this Article rejects the common-law development of the role of the 
corporate lawyer is that it makes it difficult for the individual lawyer 
-or firm-to respond to change. No matter how clear it may be-
come that the corpo~ate legal adviser is the equivalent of a "Certified 
Public Lawyer," with primary obligations to the public, the first law-
yer who honestly and openly adopts that mantle would be without 
clients shortly. The rational client is likely to prefer the lawyer who 
will preserve confidences to the one who will not. It follows that the 
bar must respond to the problem with relative uniformity. 
The Historical Role of the Lawyer Has Been Beneficial In any 
analysis such as this, the cases available for review are typically 
those in which lawyers have acted poorly or, at the least, have not 
sufficiently improved the behavior of their clients. Too much atten-
tion to those cases tends to create a rather dim picture indeed of the 
corporate lawyer-particularly when viewed in the light of the gen-
eral public skepticism directed at lawyers following the Watergate 
scand~ and its related developments. If that picture were accurate, 
there would be no question that the role of the corporate lawyer 
should be dramatically altered. But it is not accurate. While there are 
no reliable data, it is clear that most corporate lawyers try to per-
suade their clients to operate in a socially desirable manner and, in-
deed, that most corporate clients naturally tend to so operate. The 
usual case of antisocial behavior is the result of oversight, not intent, 
and the lawyer is generally successful in correcting it. Unfortunately, 
the nature of the lawyer's role is such that its benefits are seldom 
seen while its failures attain high visibility. 
l. WHERE WE WERE 
A. · The Historical Role of the Lawyer and His Ethics 
It is not the function of this Article to trace the heritage of law-
yers in the common-law system or to examine the gradual develop-
ment of the notions of proper or "ethical" behavior for those 
engaged in the practice of law. However, since it is the purpose of 
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this Article to analyze the role of the lawyer and the lawyer's profes-
sional obligations, it is necessary to have at least a minimal under-
standing of the background of legal ethics, and of how the Code 
came to be what it is, before analyzing the question of what the role 
of the lawyer should be for the future, and how a new code might be 
developed to reflect that role. 
It is generally accepted that the progenitor of our notions of legal 
ethics, at least as a relatively specific compilation· of standards, was 
Judge George Sharswood, who in 1854 made public his lectures 
given on that topic to the law students at the University of Penn-
sylvania. 6 A review of that volume is surprisingly useful in isolating 
the sources of many of our notions of proper behavior for lawyers. 
Of course, Judge Sharswood's work cannot stand today as a com-
plete authority on legal propriety. The world has changed much in 
one and one-quarter centuries, and some of the norms accepted by 
Judge Sharswood have already been rejected. Such, for example, is 
the case with contingent fees, condemned by Judge Sharswood and 
now clearly accepted-except in criminal cases-by the Code. More-
over, even to the extent that Judge Sharswood's dictates were ac-
cepted as authoritative, their application to many contemporary 
problems would be unclear. Despite such limitations, however, 
Judge Sharswood's observations, developed in a much simpler 
world, remain important to an understanding of our current stan-
dards of proper behavior. 
Initially, it is noteworthy that Sharswood's volume carries the 
subtitle "A Compend of Lectures on the Aims and Duties of the Pro-
fession of the Law." That subheading itself implies a distinction 
identified in the Code: that the profession has both aims and duties, 
that the former are the ideals for which its members should strive, 
and that the latter are the minimum obligations for the breach of 
which discipline may be imposed. This analysis suggests-as noted 
in the introduction to this Article-that it is an error of significance 
to evaluate the proper, desired role of the lawyer primarily by exam-
ining cases concerned with the issue of liability. In the same sense, if 
the development of the role of the securities lawyer is to take place 
through the common-law method of case-by-case decision, attention 
likely will be given only to the minimum level of required behavior, 
since only behavior tending toward that level will be the subject of 
litigation. 
6. G. SHARSWOOD, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1854). 
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One need go no further than the initial two sentences of Judge 
Sharswood's lecture to recognize that the problems to which he ad-
dressed himself remain in essence those with which we are now con-
fronted: "there is, perhaps, no profession, after that of the sacred 
ministry, in which a high-toned morality is more imperatively neces-
sary than that of the law. There is certainly, without any exception, 
no profession in which so many temptations beset the path to swerve 
from the line of strict duty and propriety; in which so many delicate 
and difficult questions of casuistry are continually arising." 
That quotation, of course, does not answer any of the questions 
with which we are concerned, for the primary difficulty is in deter-
mining exactly what the "line of strict duty and propriety" is and to 
whom that duty runs. However, Judge Sharswood's suggestion that 
there is in all of us a natural temptation to avoid the difficult deci-
sion and, in context, to leave the decision to the client, is an impor-
tant one when lawyers are concerned with the ethical standards for 
lawyers. If we choose to call ourselves a profession, with ali that is 
implied in that word, we cannot avoid the responsibility with which 
we are faced. As former Commissioner Sommer has observed, the 
legal profession does not consist merely of highly paid scriveners, 
but of people called upon to exercise professional judgment.7 It is 
equally important, however, to realize that acceptance of that duty 
does not by itself dictate that all significant questions are to be de-
cided by the lawyer. There are certainly instances in which deferring 
to the client is not an abdication of duty but an adherence to it. In-
deed, the difficult duty may sometimes be to accept the client's deci-
sion that runs contrary to the lawyer's judgment. Thus, one of the 
functions of a code of responsibility is to indicate the circumstances 
in which deferral to the wishes of the client is required. 
Perhaps the most significant legacy left to us by Judge Shars-
wood is his recognition of the importance-though not exclusive im-
portance-of the lawyer's duty to the client. "[T]he great duty which 
the counsel owes to his client, is an immovable fidelity."8 But Judge 
Sharswood was also aware of the conflicts that plague us today·and 
that have always created public concern with the lawyer's role. That 
is, the acceptance of confidentiality as a norm inevitably results in 
cases where a breach of confidence would have furthered justice: 
7. Speech by A. Sommer, Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities Lawyer (January 
1974), reprinted in [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.(CCH) ~ 79,631, at 83,689. 
8. G. SHARSWOOD, supra note 6, at 50. 
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[W]hat are the limits of his duty when the legal demands or interests of 
his client conflict with his own sense of what is just and right? This is a 
problem by no m~ans of easy solution. 
That lawyers are as often the ministers of injustice as of justice is 
the common accusation in the mouth of gainsayers against the pro-
fession. It is said there must be a right and a wrong side to every law-
~ fu ~ ~~ ~ ~ h ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~~ oo 
which side the truth and justice of the cause lie; yet he will maintain, 
and often with the appearance of warmth and earnestness, that side 
which he must know to be unjust, and the success of which will be 
wrong to the opposite party. Is he not then a participator in the injus-
tice? 
It may be answered in general:-
Every case is to be decided by the tribunal before which it is 
brought for adjudication upon the evidence, and upon the principles of 
law applicable to the facts as they appear upon the evidence. No court 
or jury are invested with any arbitrary discretion to determine a cause 
according to their mere notions of justice. Such a discretion vested in 
any body of men would constitute the most appalling of despotisms. 
Law, and justice according to law-this is the only secure principle 
upon which the controversies of men can be decided. It is better on the 
whole that a few particular cases of hardship and injustice, arising 
from defect of evidence or the unbending character of some strict rule 
oflaw, should be endured, than that general insecurity should pervade 
the community from the arbitrary discretion of the judge. 
Now the lawyer is not merely the agent of the party; he is an officer 
of the court. The party has a right to have his case decided upon the 
law and the evidence, and to have every view presented to the minds of 
his judges, which can legitimately bear upon that question. This is the 
office which the advocate performs. He is not morally responsible for 
the act of the party in maintaining an unjust cause, nor for the error of 
the court, if they fall into error, in deciding it in his favor. . . . The 
lawyer, who refuses his professional assistance because in his judgment 
the case is unjust and indefensible, usurps the function of both judge 
andjury.9 
Still, Judge Sharswood was careful to enunciate that the lawyer is 
not solely responsible to the client. He quoted Chief Justice Gibson: 
"The high and honorable office of a counsel would be degraded to 
that of a mercenary, were he compelled to do the biddings of his 
client against the dictates of his conscience." To adopt the contrary 
view-to "suppose that a lawyer owes no fidelity to anyone except 
his client, and that the client is the keeper of his professional con-
science"-is a "popular but gross mistake."10 Thus, the conflict is 
framed: the lawyer owes "immovable fidelity" to the client, but is 
9. Id at 24-26. 
10. Id at 35-36. 
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not to let the client be the "keeper of his professional conscience," 
and must at all times be wary of "temptations . . . to swerve from 
the line of strict duty and propriety." 
By the third edition of his work, Judge Sharswood had added 
forty-five pages analyzing the duties of the lawyer to the public. He 
commences that discussion with the following pertinent language: 
"The dignity and importance of the Profession of the Law in a pub-
lic point of view, can hardly be over-estimated. It is in its relation to 
society at large that it is proposed to consider it."11 Though the ex-
tent of Judge Sharswood's recognition of a lawyer's public responsi-
bility may be easily exaggerated, his analysis does provide a 
historical antecedent for those who would argue the primacy of the 
public responsibilities of the lawyer. Without question, Judge Shars-
wood would not have considered the public responsibility of the law-
yer to embrace all that some commentators today have suggested. 
However, he did recognize, even then, that the duties of the lawyer 
do not begin and end with the client and that it is not sufficient to 
consider representational interests alone in an analysis of the law-
yer's behavior. The "line of strict duty'' includes some sense of a 
public duty. 
But the flaw in the Sharswood analysis, when used as a frame-
work from which to extract conclusions about the duties of all law-
yers in 1978, is apparent. To Judge Sharswood, for obvious reasons, 
the lawyer was an advocate in an adversary system whose duties re-
lated solely to that function. His entire analysis is developed in the 
context of litigation, and thus the Judge focused on the lawyer's rela-
tionship to the tribunal, to opposing counsel, and to the client who is 
a plaintiff or defendant. For Judge Sharswood, in 1854, that mode of 
11. G. SHARSWOOD, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 9 (3d ed. 1869). 
The significance of that observation can perhaps be seen from the following exchange, over 
a century later, concerning the responsibilities of the securities lawyer. That discussion, which 
took place at the Practising Law Institute's Sixth Annual Institute on Securities Regulation, 
was between Irving M. Pollack, a Commissioner of the SEC, and Donald J. Evans, a Boston 
attorney. Commissioner Pollack had previously referred to the lawyer's client as being "the 
corporation and the public," and Mr. Evans questioned that description: 
"MR. EVANS: Did you really mean to say that the public is the lawyer's client? That is 
far broader than Ray Garrett [then Chairman of the SEC] ever suggested and 
certainly much broader than what the Code of Professional Respons1bility indi-
cates. 
"COMMISSI<?~R POLI:,ACK: [H]is client is the corporation, but he has a public re-
sponsibility . . . . 
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, SIXTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 218-19 
(R. Mundheim, A. Fleischer, Jr., J. Schupper, J. Jewett & J. Thomson eds. 1975) [hereinafter 
cited as SIXTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE]. 
Of course, the recognition of Judge Sharswood in one context of a public responsibility and 
the view of Commissioner Pollack in another does not suggest that Commissioner Pollack 
must be right, or even that the Judge would agree with the Commissioner. 
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analysis was unquestionably correct. But to apply it in 1978 to all 
persons who fit within current perceptions of the function of lawyers 
demands more than a historical justification. The corporate adviser 
is not, by and large, part of an adversary system, and frequently is 
not an advocate. 
If, then, the duties and responsibilities of the corporate adviser 
are to be similar to those of the advocate, it must be for reasons that 
are sensible in the present environment. That is not to say that we 
should be surprised if the adviser's duties remain similar to those of 
the advocate, for the function of the corporate adviser evolved out of 
the adversary framework, and it may well be that society selected 
lawyers to serve as advisers because of the traditional adversary-ori-
ented principles that dictated their behavior. But the question is at 
least open for debate, and even if we conclude that the adviser's du-
ties are similar to those of the advocate, there are compelling reasons 
why the Code should not apply to the lawyer as adviser. For, as the 
next section of the Article will make clear, the Code that developed 
out of Judge Sharswood's analysis does not provide meaningful gui-
dance for the actual conduct of the adviser. Thus, whatever is ulti-
mately concluded about the adviser's role, a new code is needed to 
govern the adviser's conduct in fulfilling that role. 
B. The Code of Professional Responsibility 
The organized bar's first formal code of ethics, based largely on 
Judge Sharswood's work, was adopted by the Alabama State Bar 
Association in 1887. Following in the same mold, the American Bar 
Association in 1908 promulgated the original thirty-two canons of 
professional ethics.12 Those canons, as more clearly delineated by 
subsequent opinions of the Committee of Professional Ethics and 
Grievances, remained in force until the House of Delegates of the 
ABA adopted the present Code of Professional Ethics on August 12, 
1969, to become effective on January 1, 1970. Developed over a five-
year period by the ABA's Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethi-
cal Standards, the ·present Code, although criticized by some, 13 is a 
noteworthy updating of the ethical standards embodied in the origi-
nal canons. 
Despite its virtues, however, the present Code remains inade-
12. See CODE, supra note 1, at i. The Code of Ethics of the Alabama State Bar Association 
of 1887, as amended in 1899, is reprinted as Appendix Fin H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 352-
63 (1953). 
13. See, e.g., Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV, L. 
REV. 702 (1977). 
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quate as an ethical guide for the corporate adviser. I4 Though it does 
to some extent distinguish between the duties of the lawyer as advo-
cate and as adviser, the Code, true to its birthright, focuses prim~rily 
upon the lawyer serving in the adversary context. In so doing, it fails 
satisfactorily to resolve many of the truly complex ethical problems 
facing the corporate adviser. 
Equally significant, the Code represents only the views of the 
ABA. While those views are clearly entitled to significant weight, 
they are not binding on the court~xcept to the extent they have 
been adopted by state legislatures-or administrative agencies such 
as the SEC. I5 And even where the Code has been adopted-as it has 
been in most states-it is not at all clear that it is applicable to the 
"practice" of "federal law." Thus, it is entirely possible that some 
courts or the SEC will dictate standards differing in significant re-
spects from those that might be derived from the Code. I6 That risk is 
necessarily increased to the extent that the Code's dictates are am-
biguous, if not equivocal. 
Essential to an understanding of the Code is the recognition that 
it is divided into three bodies of material of varying length: it con-
sists of 9 canons, 137 ethical considerations (ECs) and 40 discipli-
nary rules (DRs). The canons establish the general normative 
principles to be followed. The ECs, some of which -are set forth 
under each of the canons, are defined as aspirational in nature; that 
is, they identify the goals to which professionals should generally 
aspire, recognizing that "a man's reach should always exceed his 
grasp, or what's a heaven for."I7 Finally, the DRs, also set forth 
under each of the canons, are the minimum standards of appropriate 
behavior, the violation of which subjects attorneys to discipline. I8 
Unfortunately, the nice distinctions between the ECs and the 
DRs set forth in the preliminary statement to the Code are not uni-
versally followed. The DRs tend to be viewed not simply as what 
14. See also, e.g., Paul, The Lawyer as a Tax Adviser, 25 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 412, 412 
(1953); So=er, supra note 5, at 563-64; So=er, supra note 7, at 83,688; Thode, The Ethical 
Standard far the Advocate, 39 TEXAS L. REv. 575, 578-79 (1961). But see Daley & Karmel, 
supra note 4, at 765; Freedman, A Civil Libertarian Looks at Securities Regulation, 35 OHIO ST. 
LJ. 280, 287 (1974). The Code recognizes the distinction to some extent. See Ethical Consider-
ations 7-3, 7-4, & 7-5. See also text at notes 105-06 i'!fra. , 
15. D. MELLINKOFF, LAWYERS AND THE SYSTEM OF JUSTICE 637 (1976). 
16. See, e.g., Emanuel Fields, Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 5405 [1973 Transfer 
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) iJ 79,407 (June 18, 1973). q: United States v. Simon, 425 
F.2d 796, 805 (2d Cir. 1969) (proof of defendant accountant's compliance with generally ac-
cepted auditing standards constitutes persuasive but not conclusive evidence of action in good 
faith), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1046 (1970). 
17. R. BROWNING, Andrea de! Sarlo, in COMPLETE WORKS 346 (1895). 
18. See The Preliminary Statement of the Code, CODE, supra note 1, at I. 
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must but also as what should be adopted as proper behavior, and the 
ethical considerations often appear merely as helpful guides in inter-
preting the disciplinary rules. Indeed, the Code's structure suggests 
that interpretation-only the DRs are set forth in bold-faced type 
and they take the form of statutory dictates-as do the several in-
stances where ECs are virtually identical to DRs and where DRs 
simply state behavior that may be appropriate. 
In any event, there are a number of ethical canons, ECs, and 
DRs ostensibly pertinent to the corporate adviser who perceives a 
difference between his client's interests and those of the general pub-
lic. Specifically, five canons, twenty-two ECs and eight DRs are par-
ticularly relevant, but only in the sense that if the Code is the proper 
basis for analysis, then they are the important provisons of the Code. 
Thus, they are analyzed here not so much to discern "right" answers 
to particular ethical questions facing corporate advisers, but rather to 
present the basiq outline of the Code and to consider whether it is 
actually capable of yielding such answers. 
For purposes of examination, it is useful to group the pertinent 
provisions of the Code into some six categories identifying principles 
relevant to the conduct of the corporate legal adviser. In discussing 
those categories it is, of course, important to remember that DR 1-
102(-a) establishes that it is misconduct, and hence violative of the 
disciplinary rules, for a lawyer to "violate a disciplinary rule" -an 
apparent redundancy of unknown implications-and, more impor-
tant, that it is misconduct for a lawyer to circumvent a disciplinary 
rule through the actions of another. 
1. The Nature of the Client 
Obviously a critical question in this context-perhaps, depending 
on the answer, the critical question-is "who is the client?" If "the 
public" can be accepted as the corporate adviser's client, much of 
this analysis becomes unnecessary. But that view has not yet been 
formally adopted. EC 5-18 makes clear that in the case of a corpo-
rate client it is the corporate entity itself that is the client and not the 
shareholders, board of directors, management, or any other group. 
While that concept appears to have been widely accepted, it answers 
almost no questions. It is not to be supposed that the lawyer for the 
corporate entity has the right to make decisions for it, and indeed, as 
discussed below, the lawyer generally has an obligation to defer to 
the client. How, then, does this "client" make decisions? Probably 
the answer is that the board of directors represents the client, and 
that the lawyer should look to the board for guidance. That answer is 
,, ·~ .. .. 
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certainly the one suggested by most state corporate laws. It is also the 
answer suggested by EC 7-12, which identifies considerations rele-
vant to representation of an incompetent and counsels that the law-
yer may look to and rely on the decisions of the incompetent's legal 
representative. Presumably, the board of directors is the legal repre-
sentative of the corporation, which is in a meaningful sense "incom-
petent." 
However, while that may provide a general standard, the ques-
tion raised where the board accepts or approves some level of antiso-
cial behavior is whether the lawyer is entitled to rely blindly on the 
board of directors or whether, seeing abuse by the board of directors, 
the lawyer has an obligation to tum to some other source. Could, for 
example, counsel to the corporation petition a court to mandate a 
new election of directors? Certainly that novel case has not yet been 
brought, 19 but, by reference to representation of incompetents, it 
probably is not improper for the corporate adviser to prompt a 
change of legal representatives if the legal representative is clearly 
acting improperly. However, and again by reference both to the law 
regarding incompetents and to common sense, the standard for de-
termining that the board is so acting must be relatively hard to meet, 
and the board must be given significant discretion. For the corporate 
legal adviser acting within the framework outlined above, it proba-
bly also follows that, in the case of board misbehavior, no other 
method of "protecting" the incompetent, such as disregarding the 
board's directions or taking direct action to protect the incompetent's 
beneficiaries, can be initiated sua sponte. 
If the view is taken that the board of directors cannot be accepted 
as representing the corporation-a view certainly espoused on occa-
sion by some members of the Commission20-then we are indeed in 
a difficult position, for EC 7-18 provides that no communications or 
advice should be given by counsel to a nonrepresented party, at least 
if there is any potential conflict, and DR 7-104 (a)(2) sets that forth 
as a minimal standard of conduct. Thus, if the lawyer cannot rely on 
the board of directors as representing the client, he probably should 
not discuss matters with or give advice to the board unless it is repre-
sented by separate counsel or makes a knowing waiver. And, while 
19 . .But cf. SEC v. Mattel, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc.L.REP. (CCH) ~ 
94,807 (D.D.C. 1974) (defendant agreed, under a consent decree, to appoint persons independ-
ent of management and satisfactory to the Commission as a majority of its board of directors). 
20. See, e.g., Comments of Commissioner Pollack, then Director of the Division of En-
forcement, reprinted in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, FOURTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURI-
TIES REGULATION 192 (R. Mundheim, A. Fleischer, Jr., & J. Schupper eds. 1973) [hereinafter 
cited as FOURTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE]. 
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such procedures could be adopted to avoid improper communica-
tions, it certainly would alarm most corporate boards to learn that 
they cannot discuss matters directly with corporate counsel, but must 
retain their own counsel for such purposes.21 
Furthermore, on what basis can we assume that the entity itself 
prefers socially beneficial behavior to that which is antisocial? On 
what basis can we assume that the entity wants to disclose anything 
to anybody? We could construct a presumption that entities created 
by law ''want" to obey the law, but if an action or nonaction.has a 
40% chance of being viewed by a,court as illegal, how does that pre-
sumption aid us in determining whether the entity wants to take such 
actions? Clearly the Code's definition of the corporate client, while 
theoretically pure, provides little guidance for behavior. 
2. The Lawyer Owes a Client Undivided Loyalty 
It is clear from ECs 5-14 to 5-16 that the lawyer should neither 
accept employment that would create potentially divided loyalties 
nor continue employment if a conflict of loyalty actually arises. 
Those ECs, derived directly from Sharswood's work, are established 
as minimal standards by DRs 5-lOl(a) and 5-105. However, the 
questions raised previously concerning the nature of the corporate 
client become even more substantial if the loyalty to that client must 
be "undivided." If the lawyer is to watch out for some group other 
than the group that hired him and with which he customarily com-
municates, divisions of loyalty would seem inevitable. 
There is, for example, a growing body of law concerning the re-
quirement that perquisites of corporate management be disclosed as 
remuneration.22 It is clear, however, that many legitimate business 
21. In recent years, of course, similar conflicts have become visible with corporate officers 
who take actions that are either unauthorized or not clearly authorized and that constitute 
crimes for the officer and, possibly, for the corporation; the most frequent examples are the 
cases involving "sensitive" payments by corporations. Similarly, it has long been clear that 
individual directors might need separate counsel in some situations. However, to suggest the 
existence of a general conflict between the board and the client is to elevate the particularized, 
isolated conflict to a general condition requiring permanent dual counsel. 
22. See, e.g., SEC v. Sharon Steel Corp., Civil No. 77-1631 (D.D.C., filed Sept. 20, 1977), 
SEC Litigation Release No. 8119 (Sept. 20, 1977); SEC v. Ormand Indus., Inc., Civil No. 77-
0790 (D.D.C., filed May 10, 1977), SEC Litigation Release No. 7910 (May 10, 1977); SEC v. 
Stephen K.neapler, Civil No. 77-969 (S.D. Fla., filed March 25, 1977), SEC Litigation Release 
No. 7854 (April 4, 1977); SEC v. Potter Instrument Co., Civil No. 77-0394 (D.D.C., filed 
March 9, 1977), SEC Litigation Release No. 7816 (March I, 1977); SEC v. Gould Inc., (1977-
1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 96,077 (D.D.C. 1977); Securities Act Release 
No. 5904 (Feb. 6, 1978), reprinted in 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 23,019A (Feb. 6, 1978); 
Securities Act Release No. 5856 (Aug. 18, 1977); In re Steadman Sec. Corp. (Securities Ex-
change Act Release No. 13695), (1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 
81,243 (June 29, 1977). 
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expenses, such as those for entertainment, may be viewed as attrac-
tive to management without rising to a level requiring specific dis-
closure, even though material in amount. Indeed, it would seem 
difficult in many cases to determine the precise point at which the 
business expense becomes a form of remuneration. In that regard, 
assume that the remedy for nondisclosure is reimbursement by the 
recipient, that counsel is present when the board of directors dis-
cusses an expenditure of a material amount for which arguable non-
remunerative purposes may be present, and that it is clear, because 
of the nature of the expenditure or the character of the individuals, 
that counsel will not be able to dissuade the board from making the 
expenditure, and that any subsequent request for disclosure will be 
vehemently resisted. If counsel views the board of di,rectors as the 
client, it would seem proper at the meeting to address the disclosure 
question, with the likely result that there will be produced in the 
minutes a substantial discussion of why the expenditure satisfies an 
important corporate need rather than a management desire. If the 
public shareholders are viewed as the client, it is arguable that coun-
sel should remain silent at the meeting, thereby increasing the likeli-
hood of prevailing in the anticipated argument with the board over 
disclosure or reimbursement. 
Undivided loyalty, then, is a pristine quality and, though admi-
rable, of unclear meaning in the corporate context when coupled 
with the confusion surrounding the identity of the "client." In es-
sence, the concept of undivided loyalty derives from adversary con-
siderations; indeed, it is the answer to Sharswood's "gainsayers." 
But, though it is meaningful in the adversary context to establish that 
the lawyer's specific duty to the client supersedes any general duty to 
justice (within prescribed limits) and that the client is entitled to full 
and undivided representation, the corporate adviser's duty to the cli-
ent is much more ambiguous. 
3. The .Duty To Be Free from Influence 
There has always been recognized a duty of "independence" on 
the part of attorneys, in the sense that the attorney's advice to his or 
her client should not be influenced by any external considerations. 
In Judge Sharswood's language, "a client ... has a right to presume 
. . . that [his attorney] has no interest which may betray his judg-
ment or endanger his fidelity."23 That duty is recognized in a 
23. G. SHARSWOOD, supra note 6, at 46 (quoting Story, J., in Williams v. Reed, 29 F. Cas. 
1386, 1390 (C.C.D. Me. 1824)). 
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number of instances in the Code and, it is important to note, relates 
to the acceptance of clients as well as to their representation. Even 
though the American bar has never adopted the view of the English 
barrister's obligation to accept clients, ECs 2-26 through 2-28 clearly 
establish as an aspirational goal that representation should not be 
declineq. because of the unpopular nature of the client or, in the lan-
guage of EC 2-28, "to avoid adversary alignment against ... public 
officials, or influential members of the community."24 Similarly, the 
duty of representation precludes, as a rninirnnm-i.e., discipli-
nary-obligation, withdrawal from representation without reason-
able precautions to avoid prejudice to the rights of the client.25 
Furthermore, the lawyer's representation of the client must be free of 
"compromising influences," including the "desires of third par-
ties,"26 that might impair representation.27 
Again, as the reference to "adversary alignment" in EC 2-28 
quoted above makes clear, the duty to be free from influences stems 
from historical adversary considerations, and it seems to have been 
disregarded by the SEC in recent years.28 Whether or not it should 
be disregarded is a separate question, but it is clear that there is no 
systemic requirement for such a principle with respect to the practice 
of the corporate adviser. While the system of justice we have 
adopted may be dependent upon both sides having roughly equal 
representation, that consideration is not nearly as convincing in an 
advisory as in an adversary context. ' 
4. There Is a Strong Ethical Obligation To Preserve Confidences 
This obligation to preserve confidences is the entire subject of 
Canon 4: "A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of 
a Client." "Confidences" and "secrets" are defined-for reasons not 
entirely clear-in a disciplinary rule, DR 4-lOl(A): a confidence is 
an item of information protected by the attorney-client privilege 
under applicable law, and a secret is an item of information not so 
protected but nonetheless gained in the representation, the disclosure 
of which would be contrary to the desires or interest of the client. 
Clearly the scope of the Canon is considerably broader than the legal 
requirements of the attorney-client privilege. 
24. CODE, supra note 1, EC 2-28. 
25. CODE, supra note 1, DR 2-l 10(A)(2). 
26. CODE, supra note 1, EC 5-1. 
27. CODE, supra note 1, EC 5-21. 
28. See text at note 91 iefra. See also Freedman, supra note 14. 
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While this obligation is not absolute and other considerations 
may permit, or even require, disclosure in some circumstances, it 
cannot be lightly regarded. Its significance arises once again from 
the Code's identification of a particular need of the adversary sys-
tem. Within that system the lawyer must to a large extent be the 
vocal chord of the client. And if that system is to function at all well, 
the client must be encouraged to be completely open to the lawyer, 
and the lawyer must be able, with free conscience, to obtain the ful.: 
lest disclosure from the client. "A client must feel free to discuss 
whatever he wishes with his lawyer and a lawyer must be equally 
free to obtain information beyond that volunteered."29 
5. Final Decisions Are the Province of the Client, Not the Lawyer 
A lawyer is expected to exercise independent judgment30 and is 
not to be disciplined for withdrawing from representation in matters 
not pending before a tribunal when a client insists that the lawyer 
engage in conduct contrary to the lawyer's judgment and advice.31 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the client has the right to disregard ad-
vice. "[T]he authority to make decisions is exclusively that of the 
client and, if made within the framework of the law, such decisions 
are binding on his lawyer."32 Indeed, DR 7-101 provides that a law-
yer "shall not intentionally fail to seek the lawful objectives of his 
client through reasonably available means" not involving conduct 
that the lawyer believes to be unlawful or contrary to other discipli-
nary rules;33 likewise, the 1awyer may not "prejudice or damage his 
client during the course of the professional relationship" except as 
required by other disciplinary rules. 34 
6. A Lawyer May Not, However, Participate in or Countenance 
Fraud or Other Illegal Activity 
This principle, clearly recognized in the Code, creates the conflict 
to which this Article is addressed. Notwithstanding the lawyer's obli-
gation of loyalty to the client, the duty to avoid the pressure of 
"other persons" such as the SEC, the duty to maintain confidences, 
and the duty to leave final decisions to the client, the lawyer also has 
29. CODE, supra note I, EC 4-1. 
30. CODE, supra note I, Canon 5. 
31. CODE, supra note I, DR 2-110 (C)(l)(e). 
32. CODE, supra note I, EC 7-7. 
33. CODE, supra note I, DR 7-IOI(A)(l). 
34. CODE, supra note I, DR 7-IOI(A)(3). 
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a duty not to counsel criminal activity, not to be a participant in the 
commission of fraud, and to prevent the perpetration of fraud. Since 
the corporate legal adviser, particularly in the securities area, spends 
a substantial quantity of time in advising clients on whether a given 
course of conduct will violate the law-and ipso facto be deemed 
fraudulent in nature-the modem corporate lawyer runs the contin-
uous risk of having failed-or at least of being perceived as having 
failed-in one set of duties or the other. 
To some extent, the problem is one of history. The initial duty to 
disclose future crimes was derived from a commonsensical applica-
tion of priorities in the ,case of murder or other threatened bodily 
harm. The duty developed before modem concepts of economic 
crime were commonly accepted. Similarly, the "fraud" to which the 
Code addresses itself arises out of an historical context, relating pri-
marily to fraud on the court, an institution of which the lawyer was 
characterized as an officer. The historical dictates on behavior that 
the lawyer could not countenance were not addressed to the kind of 
fraud and illegality envisioned by the modem securities laws, even 
acknowledging that the Hochfelder35 decision has reinserted some 
of the common-law el~ments of fraud into securities law questions. 
In short, the Code's mandates were not directed to the lawyer whose 
function is advising about business practices. 
These concepts are rendered incredibly more complex-if not 
completely unworkable-by disclosure obligations, some of a contin-
uous nature, that make the failure to disclose a past crime or fraud a 
future crime or fraud in itself. In the relatively simple world of the 
past, it was clear that the lawyer could not, for example, disclose a 
client's confession of murder. The lawyer would, however, have an 
obligation to disclose, even to the police, a planned future murder, so 
that it might be prevented. But what is the duty of the contemporary 
lawyer whose client is a corporation, when the client's president ad-
vises that he has killed his wife? That information may be material 
to investors for a number of reasons, such as its reflection on the 
"integrity of management" or its indication of the risk that the indi-
vidual's ability to serve the corporation will be impaired because he 
may be incarcerated, or, for that matter, simply because he will have 
to go through a trial. While the failure to disclose would quite possi-
bly be both criminal and fraudulent under the securities laws, is this 
really the type of crime or fraud that the lawyer should have an af-
firmative obligation to disclose? Are we satisfied by saying, as seems 
>5, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (reading a scienter requirement into§ 
IO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act). 
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clearly true, that the president is not the lawyer's client, and thus the 
lawyer has no confidentiality obligation to him? And if we allow 
ourselves that excuse, what of the lawyer who does represent the 
president personally, with the consent of an independent majority of 
the board of directors? 
In these respects, then, the Code is not dispositive of or even 
helpful with the difficult issues, because it is simply not addressed to 
the corporate context. Nor should it be thought that the example 
posed above is simply improbable, for similar situations arise in 
cases where the past behavior involved alleged failure of a president 
to file tax retums,36 larceny by the corporation itself,37 manipulative 
conduct by principals in a corporation's securities, 38 and improper 
corporate payments.39 In any such case where the past illegalities (or 
possible illegalities) have ceased, the notion of failure to disclose as 
an additional crime in itself creates a dilemma for the corporate ad-
viser. 
The specific provisions of the Code that relate to the disclosure 
obligation of the lawyer in such circumstances, inadequate though 
they may be, are EC 4-2, EC 7-10, and DRs 1-102(A)(4), 2-
110(B)(2), 4-101(C)(2), 4-10l(C)(3), 7-10l(B)(2), 7-102(A)(5), 7-
102(A)(7), and 7-102(B). Those provisions may be summarized as 
follows: 
36. In late 1976 it was discovered that the president of RCA Corp. had failed to file his 
personal income tax for five years, although apparently all-or at least substantially all-taxes 
had been paid. Although there was no litigation involving disclosure, the materiality of the 
information is suggested by the cancellation of a then-pending public offering of common 
stock. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1976, § A, at I, col. 4. If the information was sufficiently 
material to cause cancellation of an underwriting, disclosure questions would presumably have 
arisen if the underwriting had proceeded. 
31. See Solon Agrees To Pay $900,000 That SEC Says It Owes Lessors, Wall St. J., April 
26, 1977, at 3, col. 5, describing a remarkable case in which the SEC brought an action for 
failure to disclose that a portion of revenues of a corporation arose from "skimming" from 
vending machines, and, as a remedy in a consent decree, required the defendant to disgorge 
the amounts so stolen and return the funds to the lessors of the vending machines. From the 
facts of the case as reported, it appears that the defendant had ceased the allegedly larcenous 
behavior at the time the action was brought, but obviously the nondisclosure problem would 
remain. See also FOURTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE, supra note 20, at 214-18, 233-37 (responsibili-
ties for past securities law violations). 
38. See the indictment in United States v. Bloom, Crim. No. 77-383 (E.D. Pa., filed Sept. 
6, 1977), charging conspiracy to commit crimes including not only basic stock manipulation, 
but also failure to disclose material facts necessary to make statements made not misleading. 
The indictment also charges disclosure of "material non-public inside information"; most law-
yers view that as the proper thing to do with such information. 
39. See, e.g., Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 435 F. Supp. 1249 
(N.D. Ohio 1977); SEC v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. 
REP. (CCH) ~ 95,509 (D.D.C. 1976). 
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EC 4-2. A lawyer may reveal information ''when necessary to per-
form his professional employment, when permitted by a Disci-
plinary Rule, or when required by law." 
EC 7-10. Notwithstanding the duty of zealous representation, the 
lawyer should "avoid the infliction of needless harm." 
.DR l-102(A)(4). A lawyer shall not "engage in conduct involving dis-
honesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." 
.DR 2-JJO(B)(2). A lawyer must cease representation if continued em-
ployment will result in violation of a Disciplinary Rule . 
.DR 4-JOJ(C). A lawyer may reveal: 
(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Discipli-
nary Rules or required by law or court order; or 
(3) The intention of a client to commit a crime, and suffi-
cient information to prevent it . 
.DR 7-JOJ(B)(2). A lawyer may refuse to participate in conduct he 
believes to be unlawful, even though that conclusion is not 
clearly correct . 
.DR 7-102(A). A lawyer shall not: 
(5) Knowingly make a false statement of law or fact; or 
(7) Assist in conduct he knows to be illegal or fraudulent. 
.DR 7-102(B). A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing 
that his client, in the course of the representation, has perpe-
trated a fraud shall reveal the fraud if his client does not, "ex-
cept when the information is protected as a privileged 
communication." 
Of the foregoing, the last is generally thought to be the most sig-
nificant, particularly since it was amended in 1974 in light of some of 
the developments discussed in this Article. However, that amend-
ment, which added the words "except when the information is pro-
tected as a privileged communication," was apparently designed 
only to avoid having a requirement in a DR that might directly con-
flict with state law obligations to protect the privilege.40 As such, it is 
considerably less broad than the "confidences and secrets" to be pro-
tected by Canon 4. 
It is probably neither necessary nor useful for this Article to at-
tempt to reconcile these disclosure obligations with the lawyer's 
countervailing duties. It is clear that only very nice-and essentially 
disingenuous-distinctions, based on the role of disciplinary rules 
versus ethical considerations, on the importance of terms such as 
"clearly establishing" or on the implications of permissive language 
in minimal standards could lead to any roadmap of ethically proper 
conduct. Even then, the map would be harder to follow than Vespuc-
ci's chart of the New World and, more important, would only reflect 
40. ABA National Institute, Advisors to Management, 30 Bus. LAW. 20 (special issue, 
March 1975) (remarks of Lewis H. Van Dusen, Jr.). 
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"ethically proper conduct" according to a set of historical standards 
of questionable contemporary application. Rather than pursue such 
efforts to their inevitably futile end, the time has come to make a de 
novo examination of the role of the corporate adviser and to estab-
lish relatively specific standards for the conduct of those :filling that 
role. 
11. CHANGES IN THE ROLE 
The introduction to this Article referred to the changing role of 
the corporate legal adviser, a phenomenon occurring principally 
through development of the common law, though affected to some 
extent by the intrusions of a governmental agency with both an ad-
versary and a quasi-judicial role. While these events certainly are not 
dispositive of what can or should be done in the future, a considera-
tion of them is appropriate both so that the proposed reexamination 
of the corporate lawyer's role can be made against a factual back-
ground and so that account can be taken of the views explicitly or 
implicitly adopted by different bodies. 
The developments referred to in the introduction are not, by any 
means, the only discernible indications of a societal reexamination of 
the role of corporate lawyers, or of lawyers in general. Similar evi-
dence can be seen in the general atmosphere created by Watergate,41 
in the sudden-and perhaps unfortunate-trend toward ethics ques-
tions on bar examinations,42 and in the prevailing suspicion that ap-
pears to surround the activities of lawyers. Much of that criticism, of 
course, can be summarily dismissed as no more perceptive or deserv-
41. For example, Dean Monroe Freedman, in his LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY 
SYSTEM at 11 (1975) refers to several cartoons by Herblock depicting former President Nixon's 
attorney as a burglar, and suggests that similar implied accusations of the lawyers representing 
communist defendants of an earlier era would have been unacceptable. 
42. The problem is that it is difficult for bar examinations to test ethics except in the sense 
of finding out whether the examinee knows the minimum levels of ethically permissible behav-
ior, which has the unfortunate effect of emphasizing these minimum-level obligations. 
For example, question number 20 of the California Professional Responsibility Examina-
tion (February 1975 ed.) is a conflict question in which Poe consults Attorney about a matter 
which, Attorney subsequently discovers, involves Client, a prior client of Attorney. Th~ ques-
tion asked is whether it is "proper for Attorney to represent Client" when Poe subsequently 
brings a suit. "Proper" is defined in the exam to mean that Attorney would not be subject to 
discipline for taking the action and that such action is not inconsistent with the Ethicaj. Consid-
erations of the Code. The right answer is that it is proper "because Attorney acquired no 
disqualifying information from Poe." However, two of the four possible answers give reasons 
why such representation would be improper and, although they may be ''wrong" answers, we 
should hardly be disappointed if an examinee were so sensitive to conflicts that he concluded 
that Attorney must decline the representation of Client assuming that Client would suffer no 
disadvantage thereby. See State Bar of California, California Professional Responsibility Ex-
amination 2, 7, 12 (February 1975). 
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ing of respect than the age-old attack upon the lawyer who would 
represent the "known" murderer.43 The specific developments dis-
cussed below, however, are of a more substantial nature and have 
been at least tacitly endorsed by many prominent members of the 
profession. They must accordingly be given serious attention. 
A. The Audit Letter Response Settlement 
The audit letter response controversy arose between the ABA 
and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AI CPA) 
and involved the amount of "comfort" a lawyer could give to an 
accountant regarding the adequacy of disclosure in financial state-
ments. The controversy brought into focus all of the implications of 
the attorney's obligation to maintain the confidences of the,client 
and pitted against that interest the desire of auditors-fostered by 
the pressures of public attack and private liability for failure to dis-
cern fraud44-to make sure that the audited financial statements 
upon which the public relies are free from material error. Both of 
those interests are important, although the latter might have a more 
apparent, and therefore more immediate, appeal to the lay analyst. 
Given the pressure accumulating on the accounting profession in re-
cent years, the conflict was inevitable. Its resolution will have broad 
implications for concepts of the legal adviser's role in society. 
I. The Dispute 
In the early part of this century, accountants operated in an at-
mosphere relatively free from specific regulation. When the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (the 1934 Act) were adopted, the notion of a profession of ac-
countancy was recognized, but audits generally were not required 
and the concept of the accountant's "independence" was, at best, 
embryonic.45 Commencing in 1939, however, with the notorious 
scandal in the McKesson & Robbins case,46 greater responsibility was 
43. See G. SHARSWOOD, supra note 6, at 24-25. 
44. In recent years, private litigants seem to have brought actions against auditors for fail-
ure to discover fraud whenever there has been a major fraud that involved financial statements 
in any way. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); In re Equity Funding 
Corp. of Am. Securities Litigation, (1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 
94,456 (J.P.M.D.L. 1974). It is not yet clear whether the Hocl!felder decision requiring scienter 
in a private action arising under§ IO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 will signifi-
cantly reduce such private actions against accountants. 
45. See L. RAPPAPORT, SEC ACCOUNTING PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 26.1-26.4 (3d ed. 
1972). 
46. See SEC Accounting Series Release 19 (Dec. 5, 1940); L. RAPPAPORT, supra note 45, at 
5.4-5.8. The case involved the minor matter of $21 million of fictitious assets (22% of total 
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placed upon the accounting profession to maintain independence 
from audited clients and to verify the fair presentation-viewed by 
at least some courts as an obligation to investigate any suspicion of 
fraud47--of financial statements to which audit reports were ap-
pended. Recent years, of course, have seen an accelerating concern 
with these aspects of the auditors' obligations.48 
Given such pressures, auditors naturally came to give greater at-
tention to obtaining independent verification of information con-
tained in financial statements. One new source to which auditors 
began to look was corporate counsel. It is not entirely clear when 
various accounting firms commenced the practice of requesting in-
formation from counsel regarding "contingent liabilities," but it is 
clear that the trend was well under way and was causing some con-
sternation among lawyers in 1972 when the ABA Section of Corpo-
ration, Banking and Business Law began to look into the matter 
through its Committee on Corporate Laws. The work of that Com-
mittee generated, in April 1973, Richard Deer's brief but most im-
portant article,49 which gave widespread publicity to the proper role 
of counsel in discussing such matters with auditors. 
The primary concern of lawyers was the extent to which counsel 
could satisfy auditors about compliance with Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards Number Five of the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (F ASB), "Accounting for Contingencies."50 Para-
graph Ten of that standard requires financial statement disclosure if 
"there is at least a reasonable possibility that a loss . . . may have 
been incurred"51-ie., on an accrual basis, that facts have occurred 
that will give rise to an eventual payment. Disclosure is not required 
when "there has been no manifestation by a potential claimant of an 
awareness of a possible claim . . . unless it is considered probable 
that a claim will be asserted and there is a reasonable possibility that 
the outcome will be unfavorable."52 Given that standard, members 
stated assets) appearing in the balance sheet and over $18 million of fictitious sales and $1.8 
million fictitious gross profits on the income statement. 
47. United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 806-07 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1046 
(1970). 
48. See, e.g., OPINION RESEARCH CORP., PUBLIC ACCOUNTING IN TRANSITION (1974), (re-
port prepared for Arthur Andersen & Co). 
49. Deer, Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests for Information, 28 Bus. LAW. 947 
(1973). 
50. Reprinted in ABA, Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Re-
quests far Information, 31 Bus. LAW. 1709, App. A (1976) [hereinafter cited as ABA State-
ment]. 
51. Id at 1728. 
52. Id 
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of the bar were concerned both with the practical difficulties of dis-
cerning the level at which disclosure was required and with counsel's 
professional obligations to the client. Paragraph Three, which de-
fines "probable," "reasonably possible" and "remote" does not pro-
vide a great deal of clarification: 
a) Probable. The future event or events are likely to occur. 
b) Reasonably possible. The chance of the future event or events 
occurring is more than remote but less than likely. 
c) Remote. The chance of the future event or events occurring is 
slight.53 
It is only slightly helpful that a matter may also be omitted if it is not 
material, which the Supreme Court has succinctly defined as a mat-
ter about which "there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
[person] would consider it important."54 
When the legal profession became fully aware of the implications 
of such requests for information regarding contingent liabilities, the 
die was cast. By then the accounting profession had come to view 
responses to these inquiries as essential to an audit, and a failure to 
receive the appropriate response was viewed as a limitation on the 
scope of the audit, necessitating a disclaimer of opinion or, depend-
ing on the circumstances,55 other qualification, which could render 
the financial statements effectively unaudited. 56 That, in tum, had a 
serious impact on the client-which often was required to pay its 
auditors and its attorneys to debate the question-since it was re-
quired to file audited financial statements under the 1934 Act57 or, in 
the case of any new registration of securities, the 1933 Act.58 
For a number of reasons, however, the lawyers could not readily 
submit to such an inquiry. First, the lawyer has the ethical obliga-
tion, discussed earlier in this Article, to "Preserve the Confidences 
and Secrets of a Client." Accompanying that ethical obligation is the 
legal obligation, imposed under slightly varying conditions, to main-
tain the attorney-client privilege. While each of those barriers to dis-
53. Id. at 1727. 
54. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
55. See Committee on Auditors' Inquiry Responses, Lawyers Responses lo Auditors' Re-
quests far Information-a Report, 31 Bus. LAW. 561, 562-63 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Audi-
tors' Inquiry Committee Report]. 
56. See Certification of Income Statements, Securities Act Release No. 4458 (Mar. I, 
1962): "A 'subject to' or 'except for' opinion paragraph in which those phrases refer to the 
scope of the audit ... is not acceptable in certificates filed with the Commission in connection 
with the public offering of securities." 
57. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78(m) (1976). 
58. Securities Act of 1933, § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 77(l,) (1976). 
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closure might technically be overcome by the client's consent, there 
was significant doubt about whether consent coerced in this fashion 
could be valid, particularly when-as was usually the case-the cli-
ent was not fully cognizant that such disclosure might destroy the 
confidentiality privilege for all purposes.59 Moreover, most law 
firms, and in particular the larger ones, reasonably feared liability 
for a failure to recognize the full consequences of facts coming to the 
attention of their lawyers in a context other than request by the client 
for advice.6° For example, a lawyer involved in litigating one case 
might easily become aware, through discovery, of facts that could 
constitute the basis for another action by a different party against the 
client. 
Finally, of course-and to this difficulty clients were most sensi-
tive-disclosure of a contingent liability could often lead to removal 
of its contingent aspect. While a publicly held company might prop-
erly be required to disclose some potential liabilities to existing or 
potential shareholders, the analysis of whether or not disclosure was, 
in fact, required could often be a close question of judgment. Since it 
was obviously not in the interest of all shareholders to increase the 
claim's potential by disclosure, lawyers were understandably reluc-
tant to substitute their judgment for that of their clients. And since 
the lawyers themselves received no economic benefit from nondis-
closure, ran no risk from disclosure, but did run a risk in nondisclo-
sure, one could reasonably expect that a disclosure decision made by 
lawyers would have an overly conservative bias not necessarily in 
the public interest. 
Thus, there was an impasse of a substantial nature. The resolu-
tion of that impasse, a high point in cooperation between the ac-
counting and legal professions, was both commendable and highly 
successful in resolving the stalemate. Unfortunately, it may be 
viewed as resting, in the final analysis, upon a mutual abdication of 
59. See Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litigation, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. 
L. REP. (CCH) ~ 94,311 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). SeealsoABA Statement, supra note 50, at 1716. But 
see Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d-596, [1977-2) Trade Cases (CCH) ~ 61,591 (8th 
Cir. 1978) (en bane). 
60. The problem is exemplified by Capital Foundry Co. v. Gundelman, 166 F. Supp. 429 
(S.D.N.Y. 1958). That case involved misstatements about the exoneration proceeding of a law-
yer who had been disbarred; the statements were made in a proxy statement relating to the 
former lawyer's attempt to take over a corporation. The case indicates that the lawyer handling 
the exoneration proceedings, who did not participate in drafting the proxy, simply (and natu-
rally) did not realize the problem. In testimony, that lawyer said, "I should have written a 
letter to the SEC." 166 F. Supp. at 434 n.11. Obviously, much of this Article questions that 
facile conclusion. 
450 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 76:423 
purported responsibilities. As such, it is only a matter of time before 
its frailty is exposed. 
2. The Settlement 
In July 1974 a proposed response to audit inquiry letters was first 
circulated to the membership of the Section of Corporation, Banking 
and Business Law.61 In November 1974 a revised proposal was cir-
culated to Section members. 62 Finally, a further revised proposal 
was circulated in November 197563 and, in substantially that form, 
was adopted by the House of Delegates of the ABA Board of Gover-
nors as a formal statement of policy on December 8, 1975.64 Concur-
rent with the approval of the ABA statement, the AICPA Auditing 
Standards Executive Committee on January 7, 1976, adopted a 
Statement on Auditing Standards coordinated to the ABA ap-
proach. 65 
Before criticizing such a worthy effort, it is only proper to recog-
nize the significance of what was accomplished. For the first time in 
an area of such importance, the two professional bodies negotiated a 
specific set of procedures for the benefit of their mutual clients. In 
addition, the ABA, a purely voluntary organization that has as mem-
bers only about half of the legal profession, 66 successfully spoke in 
specific ways for the profession as a whole and adopted procedures 
that the profession has accepted. Furthermore, the ABA statement 
without question provides useful guidance for internal law firm re-
view and for the expression of opinions on pending and threatened 
litigation, where there is no dispute that disclosure is required and 
the opinion of counsel is important. Finally, even though the settle-
ment has potentially hazardous deficiencies, as outlined below, it did 
"buy time," in that it provided a mechanism by which law firms 
could at least in form satisfy the auditors' needs. Indeed, the remain-
ing deficiencies may simply be irremediable. Certainly, if the audi-
tors' needs are simply to live up to the "industry standards" of the 
61. Scope of Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests far Ieformation, 29 Bus. LAW. 1391 
(1974). 
62. This was subsequently printed as Scope of Lawyers' Responses lo Auditors' Requests for 
Information, 30 Bus. LAW. 513 (1975). 
63. Auditors' Inquiry Committee Report, supra note 55. 
64. ABA Statement, supra note 50. 
65. Id at Editor's Note. 
66. National Conference of Lawyers and Certified Public Accountants, Professional Serv-
ices of Lawyers and CPA's, 63 A.B.A.J. 825, 826 (1977). 
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accounting profession,67 the ABA statement could be viewed as satis-
factory, even though it is based on something of a legal fiction. 
The settlement reached between the professions, insofar as it re-
lates to contingent liabilities, has several elements. First, the client's 
request to its counsel may identify, and request comment upon, spe-
cific liabilities of a contingent nature. It will then contain a further 
statement to the following effect: · 
We understand that whenever, in the course of performing legal 
services for us with respect to a matter recognized to involve an unas-
serted possible claim or assessment which may call for financial state-
ment disclosure, if you have formed a professional conclusion that we 
must disclose or consider disclosure concerning such possible claim or 
assessment, as a matter of professional responsibility to us, you will so 
advise us and will consult with us concerning the question of such dis-
closure . . . . Please specifically confirm to our auditors that our un-
derstanding is correct.68 
The ABA statement--or the "model" form of letter annexed to but 
not a part of it-provides that outside counsel should respond with 
an appropriate confirmation in substantially similar language. 69 
The reason that this exchange is satisfactory to the auditors is the 
ABA position, expressed as a part of the ABA statement, that if the 
client fails in an obligation to disclose, the attorney "has an obliga-
tion not knowingly to participate in any violation by the client of the 
disclosure requirements of the securities laws. The lawyer may also 
be required under the Code . . . to resign his engagement if his ad-
vice concerning disclosures is disregarded by the client."70 Thus, on 
the surface, there is at least a suggestion that the accounting firm can 
assume that the client must have disclosed all "required" contingent 
liabilities, since counsel would otherwise have resigned. 
That assumption, however, is clearly unwarranted. The determi-
nation of whether a set of facts constitutes a contingent liability 
about which disclosure is required involves two highly subjective 
evaluations: first, the likelihood that the potential claim will ripen 
into an actual one, and second, the likelihood that such a claim 
would succeed, a determination that must be made before the plain-
tiff has surfaced to give his or her version of the facts. Moreover, 
67. But see United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1046 
(1970). 
68. Committee on Audit Inquiry Responses, Introductory Analysis and Guides to Statement 
of Policy Regarding Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests for I'!formation, 31 Bus. LAW. 
1737, 1744-45 (1976). 
69. ABA Statement, supra note 50, Annex A at 1734. 
70. ABA Statement, supra note 50, at 1714. 
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qualifying each of those determinations is the ever-present question 
of materiality. Finally, as discussed earlier in this Article,71 the dic-
tates of the Code are not at all clear on when counsel has an affirma-
tive obligation to resign. Indeed, it was only a few months prior to 
the settlement that the ABA House of Delegates adopted a statement 
of policy opposing disclosure by lawyers counseling on the securities 
laws and suggesting a very limited context within which such law-
yers would be obliged to terminate a representation.72 These 
problems have troubled lawyers who adopt the "standard" response 
language, and the Committee on Audit Inquiry Responses of the 
Section has properly-in terms of construing the statement's precise 
language-responded that the statement only provides that there 
must be consultation when a claim is, in fact, recognized.73 Thus, 
consistent with a careful and precise construction of the statement's 
language, the real obligations of the lawyer were not expanded by 
the settlement in any significant way. 
Yet, this state of affairs, in which such stress must be placed on 
ambiguous phrases and references are made to obligations the law-
yer "may have" to resign based on a Code really designed for other 
purposes, clearly sets a trap for the unwary-or relatively unsophis-
ticated-accountant. It is inevitable that a case will arise in which an 
accountant will claim that he understood the lawyer's response to 
provide him with satisfaction that there were no material contingent 
liabilities requiring disclosure. Moreover, the request and proposed 
response are identical whether the recipient is general counsel or spe-
cial counsel. Yet there can be no doubt at all that special counsel, 
advising on limited matters, has no duty to resign if the client, with 
71. See text at notes 30-40 supra. 
72. ABA, Statement of Policy Adopted by American Bar Association Regarding Responsibili-
ties and Liabilities of Lawyers in Advising with Respect to the Compliance by Clients with Laws 
Administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 31 Bus. LAW. 543 (1975). In this 
statement of policy the lawyer's obligation was set forth as follows: 
In appropnate circumstances, a lawyer may be permitted orrequired ... to resign .•. if 
his advice concerning disclosures is disregarded by the client and, if the conduct of a 
client clearly establishes his prospective commission of a crime or the past or prospective 
~q,etration of a fraud in the course of the lawyer's representation, even to make the 
clisclosures himself. However, the lawyer has neither the obligation nor the right to make 
disclosure when any reasonable doubt exists concerning the client's obligation of disclo-
sure .... 
Id. at 545 (emphasis added). The statement then stressed that the lawyer should not limit the 
client's rights by the lawyer's own concerns with potential liability or reprisals. Id. at 545. The 
language contained in the statement of policy adopted four months later as a part of the 
ABA/ AICPA settlement was not inconsistent with the August statement, but was considerably 
less specific and more suggestive. See text at note 70 supra. Accountants' knowledge of prior 
ABA statements, like lawyers' of AICPA deliberations, is no doubt very limited. 
13. See Committee on Audit Inquiry Responses, ABA Statement of Policy Regarding Law-
yers' Responses to Auditors' Requests for I,!formation-Second Report, 32 Bus. LAW. 177, 181-
82 (1976). 
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the advice-whether or not followed--of its general counsel, deter-
mines not to disclose matters that the special counsel, had his advice 
been sought, would have viewed as requiring disclosure. Addition-
ally, if the special counsel's representation relates only to litiga-
tion-where knowledge about other potential liabilities may be most 
likely to arise-there may be an ethical or even legal obligation not 
to withdraw from the representation. And it need hardly be stated 
that the perceptive client who does want to engage in actual fraud 
will make appropriate use of special counsel. 
Thus, the ABA-AICPA settlement, although a significant 
achievement, is deficient in material respects. And the nice distinc-
tions that the settlement requires, as well as the ease with which the 
less sophisticated may misinterpret it, suggest both that it is a resting 
place rather than a destination and that it will eventually be the sub-
ject of litigation. 74 Whether that litigation will hold liable the ac-
countant who thought he could rely or the lawyer whose letter 
written in accordance with the ABA statement created a misleading 
appearance--or both or neither-is not for this Article to predict, 
but at least one case75 suggests that little can be gained from follow-
ing the provisions of the ABA-AICPA settlement. 
The principal importance of the ABA-AICPA dispute and settle-
ment to the present analysis is not its somewhat disingenuous treat-
ment of the contingent liability disclosure problem. Rather, it lies in 
the fact that through the settlement the organized bar has accepted a 
role in the disclosµre process that differs from the purely confidential 
nature of the traditional corporate adviser. Regardless of whether 
that role is as broad as the future accountant-defendant will argue or 
as narrow as the lawyer-defendant will claim, it constitutes a change 
endorsed by the profession itself. 
B. The SEC Litigation 
The staff and members of the Commission have frequently taken 
the position that the practitioner who behaves honestly has nothing 
to fear from SEC enforcement action because proceedings are initi-
ated only in cases involving complicity or otherwise egregious be-
74. For a good analysis of the ABA-AICPA settlement in all of its dimensions, see Note, 
Allorney Responses to Audit Letters: The Problem of .Disclosing Loss Contingencies Arisingfrom 
Litigation and Unasserted Claims, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 838 (1976). 
75. United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1046 (1970) 
(an earlier case suggesting rather strong auditor responsibilities). 
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havior.76 That view is accurate as far as it goes;77 most of the 
proceedings initiated by the SEC, whether in the form of disbarment 
proceedings under Rule 2(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice78 
or of civil injunctive actions or of criminal proceedings prosecuted 
through the Department of Justice, have been brought against par-
ties whose behavior has violated that standard. But, for two reasons, 
actions brought by the SEC have an impact substantially beyond the 
specific focus of the complaint and, indeed, inevitably tend to influ-
ence the ethical standards governing the day-to-day practice of the 
corporate adviser. 
First, the simple fact that the SEC files a complaint may, given 
the prestige of the agency, have implications significantly beyond the 
specific activity cited.79 That possibility is accentuated to the extent 
the SEC shares the normal plaintiffs tendency to overstate a claim. 
Second, in a number of cases involving attorneys, SEC actions have 
been settled through a stipulation adopting internal law firm policies 
for future conduct. The two most significant of those cases are In re 
Jo M. Ferguson80 and the relatively recent settlement of a portion of 
National Student Marketing.81 Such law firm policies, even though 
16. See, e.g., Sommer, The Commission and the Bar: Forty Good Years, 30 Bus. LAW. 5, 8 
(1974). 
11. But see K.ivitz v. SEC, 475 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1973), where the District of Columbia 
Circuit criticized the SEC's action of suspending an attorney from practicing before it without 
sufficient evidence. See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 41, at 23 (discussing Kivitz). 
The Commission's power to disbar, challenged in Complaint, Touche, Ross & Co. v. SEC, 
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED, Sec. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 95,742 (S.D.N.Y., filed Oct. 12, 1976), 
dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, [Current Volume] FED, Sec. L. REP. 
(CCH) ~ 96, 415 (S.D.N.Y., Apr. 24, 1978), is set forth in rule 2(e) of the SEC's Rules of 
Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1977). The SEC's concept of what constitutes "practice" before 
it is itself an interesting study, and it appears to embrace opinion letters to the effect that 
securities may be sold, see Sam Clammer, Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 5518 (Aug. 2, 
1974) (4 SEC DocKET 656 (1974)), written or oral legal opinions regarding matters "involving 
or related to" any documents normally filed with the SEC under any acts within its jurisdic-
tion, see Sitomer, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 12501 (June 1, 1976), and 
consulting with the Commission or its staff, see id. These concepts are remarkable, among 
other reasons, because some of the activities in Sitomer may legitimately be, and often are, 
performed by a layman. It is also clear that the opinions referred to in Clammer are not of a 
type that need be filed with or otherwise come before the SEC. A recent case, Koden v. United 
States Dept. of Justice, 564 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1977), involving a rule of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service comparable to rule 2(e), 8 C.F.R. § 2923(a)(l4) (1977), suggests that 
rule 2(e) itself is a valid exercise of the SEC's authority. 
78. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(c) (1977). 
79. That is certainly the case with the complaint in SEC v. National Student Marketing 
Corp., (1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. Sec. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 93,360 (D.D.C. 1972). See 
notes 84-86 infra and accompanying text. 
80. Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 33-5523 (Aug. 21, 1974), reported in 5 SEC DocKET 
37 (1974). 
81. SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., (1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED, Sec. L. 
REP. (CCH) ~ 96,027 (D.D.C. May 2, 1977). 
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adopted in the context of specific Commission proceedings, obvi-
ously contain, suggestions on what is thought by that agency to be 
proper conduct. That the behavior of lawyers generally will be af-
fected by these suggestions seems indisputable, 82 and that conclusion 
is supported by the Supreme Court's recent recognition that SEC set-
tlements have some precedential value. 83 Thus, while it may be true 
that "honest practitioners" do not have to fear the SEC, they do have 
to fear private litigants who follow SEC-provided precedent, and 
they do have to determine what it means to be an "honest lawyer." 
Thus, the SEC, in this rather oblique and perhaps even inadver-
tent manner, tends to create standards of practice through its actions 
based on specific occurrences that it finds to be extreme. Absent any 
broad policy-oriented and fully responsive action by the bar, there is 
a clear danger that ethical standards will be developed on a haphaz-
ard basis. If, on the other hand, the standards are developed by the 
SEC with a clear view of what that agency wants in the broader con-
text of securities regulation, they suffer from the infirmity of being 
established by a process in which significant interests are not being 
represented. One fairly recent event puts this problem in focus. In 
National Student Marketing, the SEC charged two major law firms 
with failing to take proper action when they "permitted" their clients 
to consummate a merger transaction that had been approved by 
shareholders on the basis of a proxy statement containing materially 
misleading financial information. The language of paragraph 48(i) 
of the SEC complaint shocked the corporate bar by its suggestion of 
what proper conduct included: "As part of the fraudulent scheme 
[the law firms and certain identified partners] ... failed to insist 
that . . . shareholders be resolicited, and failing that, to . . . notify 
the plaintiff Commission concerning the misleading nature of the 
nine month fmancial statements." 
That complaint was filed February 3, 1972. Within less than one 
year, an attorney, unable to compel_ what he viewed as a required 
disclosure related to his law firm's fee arrangement with the client 
and undoubtedly influenced by the National Student Marketing 
82. See, e.g., Chappel & Cheek, Tlte Development of Law Firm Policies and Procedures 
Relating lo Securities Molters, in 2 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, NINTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE 
ON SECURITIES REGULATION [hereinafter cited as NINTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE]; Feller & Loo, 
The Audit Commillee, in 1 NINTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE, supra, at 5, both of which draw from 
consent decrees, among other sources, in giving advice on the way in which lawyers and audit 
committees should conduct themselves. 
83. See DuPont v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 54-55 (1977): "In reviewing a decision of the (Se-
curities and Exchange] Commission ... '(c]ontemporaneous construction is entitled to great 
weight . • • even though it was applied in cases settled by consent rather than by litigation.' " 
(quoting FTC v. Mandel Bros., 359 U.S. 385, 391 (1959)). 
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complaint, resigned from his law firm and reported the matter to the 
SEC. 84 Viewed solely by reference to the specific facts of this case 
and without regard to broader societal considerations, the lawyer's 
action could be seen as achieving a beneficial result. Following it, 
the disclosure he had demanded was made and, naturally, a class 
action followed. The action was subsequently settled for $785,000, of 
which $625,000 was paid by the attorney's form.er law firm and 
$160,000 by his former client. 85 If the settlement indicates a realistic 
fear of loss, rather than a fear of the substantial nonmonetary dam-
age that the law firm might have suffered had the matter been de-
cided in court, the argument can be made that his action made 
possible the righting of a wrong. 86 
But is it really desirable for lawyers to proceed in this fashion? 
Are important questions not at least raised when a lawyer takes ac-
tions so detrimental to his client, particularly when substantial doubt 
apparently existed about the materiality of the nondisclosure?87 It is 
certainly true that the provisions of the Code can be interpreted to 
permit-or even to require-the lawyer's behavior, but they can also 
be interpreted to prohibit it. And either course of behavior could be 
dictated as proper by a rational society. Admitting, then, that the 
merit of the lawyer's action is at least debatable, the crucial point is 
that his conduct was undoubtedly the result of three factors-an am-
biguous Code with consequent uncertainty as to what "proper pro-
84. See Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190, 1192-94 (2d Cir. 
1974). It would appear that the Stuart Charles Goldberg whose activities were reported in the 
Meyerhofer case is the same Stuart Charles Goldberg who edited a volume entitled Expanding 
Responsibilities Under the Securities Laws (1973), a transcript of a conference sponsored by the 
New York Law Joumalheld on June 5-6, 1972, which was concerned with the responsibilities 
of lawyers and accountants under the securities laws and the relationship of those profession-
als to their clients, to the SEC, and to the public. 
85. Federman v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., (1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. 
REP. (CCH) f 95,418 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
86. From the facts available in the reported decisions in this case, see Federman v. Empire 
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 94,822 
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), and cases cited in notes 84 and 85 supra, it is difficult to appraise the settle-
ment in terms of the realistic potential recovery. The case related to a public offering of 
500,000 shares of common stock at $16 per share. The stock price rose to at least $17 per share 
during the period in which the allegedly incomplete prospectus was circulated, and thereafter 
fell at least as low as $7 per share. A potential claim of almost $5,000,000 could thus be envi-
sioned, with the $785,000 settlement being only approximately 15% of the claim. However, 
during the relevant time period there were substantial market declines generally, and particu-
larly in the stocks of companies in the same business as the defendant corporation; proof of 
such general declines has been permitted to be used to mitigate damages by showing that 
losses were "caused" by factors other than the omission in a prospectus. See Securities Act of 
1933 § ll(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1976); Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. 
Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). Moreover, the contribution of the law firm to the settlement fund 
would seem substantial relative to its potential exposure. 
87. See Federman v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED, 
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) f 95,418, at 99, 114-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
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f essional conduct" encompasses, the rather strong language of 
paragraph 48(i) of the National Student Marketing complaint, and 
the lawyer's understandable apprehension about his own potential 
exposure. It is not difficult to argue that this is not the stuff of which 
such delicate decisions should be made. 
Furthermore, society's interest in controlling the extent to which 
SEC actions or settlements influence ethical standards for the legal 
profession is made all the more apparent by a consideration of the 
character of an SEC proceeding. The SEC perceives particular be-
havior as an extreme example of bad representational conduct and 
then decides to bring an action. At that point, however, normal ad-
versarial tendencies likely will characterize the processing of the 
case-ie., there may be a desire to obtain the maximum victory in a 
partisan rather than social sense, and the complaint issued may be 
drawn in that spirit. The defendant law firm, on the other hand, is 
faced with protracted and potentially very embarrassing proceedings 
against a well-financed opponent, with the ever-present risk of de-
feat and consequent exposure both to disbarment from practice 
before the Commission and to private suits for civil damages. In 
light of such circumstances, it is understandable, if disappointing, 
that any settlement reached will evidence little consideration of the 
lawyer's general role and social obligations. 
Thus far, this portion of the analysis has focused primarily on 
questions of process, questioning whether society ought not to be 
more concerned about the SEC's influence, intended or otherwise, 
over ethical standards for corporate practice when the Commission 
has been denied direct authority in that regard. 88 The substantive 
aspects of recent SEC litigation, however, remain to be considered. 
Although it should be clear that the author has substantial concern 
with the developments in this area, that concern is less with the spe-
cifics than with the cumulative impact and direction of the cases. 
The Ferguson and National Student Marketing settlements, together 
with some others of lesser importance, 89 are, for the most part, inof-
88. See 5 U.S.C. § 500 (1976), in which Congress specifically refrained from giving admin-
istrative agencies the right to establish minimum requirements for admission to practice. Sec-
tion 500(d)(2), however, makes clear that the provision does not by itself preclude disciplinary 
actions by such agencies. 
89. See, e.g., Plotkin, Yolles, Siegel & Turner, Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 5841 
(July 5, 1977) [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) f 81,236; SEC v. Pe-
trofunds, SEC Litigation Release No. 8001 (June 28, 1977); SEC v. Geo Dynamics Oil & Gas, 
Inc., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 95,565 (D.D.C. 1976); Stipula-
tion of Wright, Robertson & Dowell, in SEC v. Allegheny Beverage Corp., Civil No. 932-73 
(D.D.C. 1975); reported in SEC Litigation Release No. 6978 (July 11, 1975); McLaughlin & 
Stem, Ballen & Miller, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 11553 (July 25, 1975). 
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fensive: the clear thrust of the procedures adopted is toward a more 
careful administration of the function of lawyering. 
Considered in a broader frame of reference, however, the details 
of the Ferguson and National Student Marketing settlements offer 
substantial grounds for concern. Specifically, the internal law firm 
procedures adopted appear to conflict significantly with provisions 
of the Code and with other standards of professional conduct previ-
ously accepted as legitimate. This Article will later consider whether 
we should view those conflicts as a measure of progress.9° For the 
present it is sufficient that we recognize the nature of the diversions. 
1. The Acceptance of Clients 
In both the Ferguson settlement and the more recent settlement 
of a part of National Student Marketing, procedures were established 
that appear clearly designed to discourage representation of clients 
that may be characterized as disreputable. The first case provided for 
review and investigation prior to acceptance of a position as bond 
counsel. The latter case established a more detailed procedure, in 
which the firm agreed both to have a committee of partners consider 
any new representation of a client with registered securities and to 
make inquiry-with the client waiving its confidentiality privilege 
for these purposes-of prior counsel if that counsel had terminated 
its representation and of any auditors who were terminated within 
the preceding two years. Disregarding the risk that such a coerced 
waiver of confidentiality could unknowingly subject the client to a 
much broader waiver,91 this process of screening of clients is clearly 
contrary to the dictates of three ethical considerations: ECs 2-26, 2- ~ 
27, and 2-28: 
A lawyer is under no obligation to act as adviser or advocate for every 
person . . . but . . . a lawyer should not lightly decline proffered em-
ployment. 
[A] lawyer should not decline representation because a client or a cause 
is unpopular or community reaction is adverse . . . . 
The personal preference of a lawyer to avoid adversary alignment 
against . . . public officials . . . does not justify his rejection of ten-
dered employment. 
2. Representational Ethics 
Both the Ferguson and National Student Marketing settlements 
include provisons to the effect that the firms involved will maintain 
90. See text at notes 132-61 infra. 
91. See note 59 supra and accompanying text. 
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written evidence of their client investigations. In •the more recent 
case, which involved a very large firm, the purpose of that provision 
is said to be to ensure that information gathered will be available 
"on a continuing basis to lawyers actively involved in the Firm's rep-
resentation of the client."92 But two other, and more likely, purposes 
may be seen as the bases for the preparation and retention of such 
documents. One is that, in any subsequent proceeding, these docu-
ments will make it easier to examine the firm's behavior. The other, 
which is to the firm's self-interested advantage, is that in a future 
proceeding it will be easier to confirm what advice the client was 
given, and the extent to which the firm was innocent if the cli.ent 
participated in any fraudulent activity. For the latter reason, it is not 
at all unusual for lawyers presently in practice to maintain compre-
hensive files containing the information received from clients and 
the advice given when sensitive questions arise. 
While no provisions of the Code specifically discuss the propriety 
of such memoranda, it is generally clear that they serve no client-
related purpose. Rather, they create a record by which lawyers may 
free themselves of blame and place it squarely at the feet of the cli-
ent. Given that purpose, there is clear conflict with the spirit both of 
Judge Sharswood's view that "[a]ll considerations of self should be 
sunk by the lawyer in his duty to the cause,"93 and oLCanon 7, 
which requires zealous representation of clients. Without even in-
quiring about whether the client is charged for the time the lawyer 
spends developing such insulation from the client's liability, it is ap-
parent that the maintenance of these records drives a wedge into the 
notion of the lawyer's loyalty to the client. 
3. Limitation of Engagements 
The propriety of limited engagements is a third area in which the 
SEC settlements indicate a departure from what may have been con-
sidered the normal practice. Ferguson, which involved claims of se-
curities law violations by bond counsel with admittedly little 
expertise in securities matters, implicitly suggests that the lawyer 
whose engagement is limited may be unable to avoid some responsi-
bility for the transaction as a whole. That suggestion is supported by 
recent charges involving tax counsel issuing opinions that are used in 
securities transactions94 and by the criticism of bond counsel in the 
92. SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. 
REP. (CCH) ~ 96,027 (D.D.C. May 2, 1977), at 91,599. 
93. G. SHARSW00D, supra note 6, at 51. 
94. To date, the enforcement actions brought by the SEC have not involved the claim that 
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recent SEC report on transactions in securities of the City of New 
Y ork.95 In cases of this sort, the clearly emerging view of the SEC, 
although a view disputed by the only recent decision in the area,96 is 
that it is improper for a lawyer to accept a limited engagement and 
to deliver an opinion consisting of legal conclusions on relatively 
narrow issues without making an analysis both of the entire transac-
tion and of the adequacy of disclosure. While the SEC's view does 
not contravene any aspect of the Code and may even find some min-
imal support in the provisions relating to the obligation to provide 
adequate and competent representation,97 it certainly is at odds with 
heretofore normal expectations that a client could permissibly limit 
the scope of the legal engagement. 
4. .Disclosure and Confidentiality 
The Ferguson settlement required that counsel make clear to po-
tential clients that the firm has a duty to bondholders as well as to 
the issuer. It also required, in bond offerings pertaining to the con-
struction of facilities-as was the bond issue in that case-that coun-
sel to the user of the facilities and to any guarantor be asked to 
review the offering circular and confirm that there were no recog-
nized material omissions. The National Student Marketing settle-
ment contained a provision requiring "appropriate" response to 
inquiries from independent public accountants in accordance with 
the ABA-AICPA settlement and other provisions98 designed to pro-
vide for all disclosure deemed necessary by the firm. 
tax counsel, issuing a limited tax opinion, has participated in a securities fraud; all of the cases 
have involved greater complicity of counsel, or have involved claims that the tax opinions 
themselves were, or were described in a manner that was, inaccurate and misleading. See cases 
cited at note 89 supra. 
95. See SEC, STAFF REPORT ON TRANSACTIONS IN SECURITIES OF THE CITY OF NEW 
YoRK, ch. 6 (1977), 
96. Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (firm 
retained as "bond counsel" for $6500 fee could not reasonably be expected to investigate over-
all soundness of issue). 
97. See CODE, supra note 1, Canon 6 and Ethical Considerations 6-1 to 6-6. 
98. The agreement to conform to the ABA-AICPA settlement is set forth in paragraph 
eight of the letter from the firm to the SEC that constituted a part of the settlement. Paragraph 
four of that letter provided that if, in the course of a transaction involving the issuance of 
securities, the firm became aware of a false or misleading representation that was not corrected 
by the client, the responsible partner would "consider with at least two other partners of the 
Firm the need for the Firm to withdraw from employment or take other appropriate action." 
(emphasis added.) Paragraph six provided for review of most registration statements under the 
Securities Act prior to their effectiveness by a partner experienced in securities matters who 
had not been involved in the transaction. SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., (1977-
1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 96,027 at 91,600 (D.D.C. 1977). 
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These provisions clearly move toward a view that the public is 
the true client of the attorney and suggest a concomitant departure 
from the more traditional views expressed in the Code and discussed 
earlier in this Article. The Ferguson case is particularly dramatic, in 
that the case does not involve a proxy statement, or even an equity 
offering, where the shareholder could come within a reasonable but 
extended definition of the corporate "client." Given the Code's am-
biguity, it certainly would be djfficult to make clear exactly what the 
duty to bondholders is thought to embrace, and by no stretch of the 
imagination can that duty, at least on the basis of any existing stan-
dard, be put on a level with the duty to the issuer. One must presmpe 
that the settlement envisions some stronger responsibility than that 
to which the Code refers, though its dimensions remain uncertain. 
The substantial questions and ambiguities of the ABA-AICPA 
settlement have already been analyzed. The apparent imprimatur 
granted to it by the SEC in the National Student Marketing settle-
ment, particularly in light of the strong disclosure obligation asserted 
by the complaint in that action, suggests that the SEC may view the 
lawyer's obligations under that settlement to be more extensive than 
the bar has been prepared to admit.99 The provision in the Ferguson 
settlement for a comparable inquisition of other counsel, particul~rly 
without the voluminous analysis that preceded the ABA-AICPA set-
tlement, raises even more perplexing questions. Why should counsel 
to an entity not a "party" to the offering circular pass upon it? Wha~ 
are the limits on that counsel's behavior? Does that counsel have 
some obligation of "due diligence" review? Does that counsel be-
come a potential aider and abettor100 if his letter permits a mislead-
ing offering circular to go to the public? Is that counsel's duty to his 
client subordinated to a general public responsibility? 
It is clear then, that there is substantial movement away from the 
Code. It is not at all clear where that movement is going or what its 
boundaries are. 
5. The Locus of .Decisionmaking Authority 
Finally, and perhaps most important, certain of the specific pro-
cedures adopted in the National Student Marketing settlement con-
99. See text at notes 70-73 supra. 
100. CJ. SEC v. Universal Major Indus., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 
(CCH) t 95,229 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), a.ffd, 546 F.2d 1044 (2d. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 
(1977) (aiding and abetting violation in opinion letter by offeror's counsel used to convince 
offerees that shares were exempt from registration requirements); SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 
F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973). 
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cemed the circumstances under which the firm would refuse to 
deliver an opinion or would consider taking other affirmative action. 
While some parts of those provisions relate to the confidentiality 
question discussed above, others raise questions about who is re-
sponsible for making decisions. That is seen particularly in the settle-
ment provision setting forth that 
[i]n connection with any transactions involving the issuance of secu-
rities to the public where the Firm represents the issuer . . . the Firm 
will not deliver any opinion . . . if it has knowledge that (i) any mate-
rial representation or warranty . . . is not true and correct in material 
respects . . . or (ii) there has been any material adverse change . . . 
unless in either case the client has taken appropriate corrective ac-
tion.101 
Obviously "knowledge" and "material" are imprecise terms, and 
reasonable minds may differ about their application in specific cases. 
But it appears that the law firm is now expected to determine their 
meaning on its own and, by refusal to deliver an opinion, to force its 
interpretation on the client. Thus, the SEC settlement has shifted the 
locus of decisionmaking authority from that envisioned by the 
Code.102 Furthermore, in the circumstances of a normal public off er-
ing, when timing is critical, a firm's refusal to deliver an opinion is 
tantamount to withdrawal from the representation and seriously dis-
advantages the client, again contrary to the dictates of the Code. 103 
It is important to note that the settlement does not make any ref-
erence to the contents of the opinion-i.e., whether it is general or 
limited in scope-or to the type of securities offering involved. A 
persuasive argument could be made that, if the firm thought there 
were a material misrepresentation in a public offering made on a 
firm underwriting basis, the attorney's obligation would not extend 
past making an appropriate disclaimer or reference in any part of the 
opinion affected by the misrepresentation. If the issuer and the un-
derwriter-which has the advice of its own counsel and is the initial 
purchaser of the securities--disagreed with the firm's conclusion and 
were willing to accept the business risks of that disagreement, they 
could reasonably be allowed to do so. Under the terms of the Na-
tional Student Marketing settlement, however, that will not be per-
mitted, since the counsel's opinion is designed to be used as leverage. 
No opinion at all will be delivered if the firm concludes that there is 
101. SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC, L. 
REP. (CCH) ~ 96,027 at 91,600 (D.D.C. 1977). 
102. See text at notes 30.34 supra. 
103. CODE, supra note 1, DR 2-110(A)(2) and EC 2-32. 
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a material misrepresentation. Such use of the lawyer's opinion sub-
stantially changes the lawyer's position with regard to public offer-
ings. And, though the consequences of a failure to deliver an opinion 
in a merger·or acquisition transaction could be less severe, the settle-
ment draws no such distinctions. 
C. Implications of the SEC Litigation 
It is apparent that there are substantial trends, some of them ac-
cepted by the bar, that draw the corporate adviser ever closer to a 
direct disclosure obligation and suggest that the function served by 
the corporate legal adviser is increasingly to be viewed as equivalent 
to the view that many have of the accountant-Le., an independent 
protector of the public interest.104 However, that trend is occurring 
without any recognition of it in the Code, and as a result lawyers are 
more and more called upon to interpret the Code's conflicting provi-
sions or even to determine on their own whether to satisfy the Code's 
assertions of propriety or those of the newly developing standards. 
Further, since these developments tend to occur in the incremental 
fashion of the common law, there is little guidance for questions that 
have not arisen in the past. For example, do the same considerations 
apply to counsel in a bond offering as in a communication with 
shareholders? Certainly a persuasive case can be made for a stricter 
duty to the corporate owners than to lenders; if "public interest" is 
the critical element, however, that distinction may not carry the day, 
as, indeed, Ferguson suggests that it will not. 
Just as these developments demand the conclusion that the per-
ceived role of the corporate legal adviser is changing, so also do they 
call for a broadly based, thoughtful, and authoritative determination 
of what that role should be. Surely corporate advisers must have, at 
the present time, a sense of frustration. They might be willing to ac-
cept a new role if it were rationally defined, so that they could pat-
tern their behavior to comply with it. But the role is changing in an 
uncoordinated fashion, and the formal structure within which the 
104. The accounting profession does not necessarily admit the accuracy of this description. 
See note 113 infra. However, virtually all of the legal literature on the question of the role of 
the lawyer assumes some such description of the accountant's role, and it is reasonably clear, 
to date at least, that the accountant's role is a more public one than the lawyer's. The most 
recent analysis, carried out by an independent commission established by the AICPA, con-
cluded that the role of the auditor is to eliminate the inherent potential conflict between man-
agement and the users of financial statements, which suggests a relatively publicly oriented . 
function. THE COMMN. ON AUDITORS' REsPONSIBILlTlES, REPORT, CONCLUSIONS AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS 1-12 (1978) (The Cohen Commission Report). 
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corporate adviser operates has not changed in pertinent respects over 
the past twenty years. 
III. THE CORPORATE LEGAL ADVISER'S ENVIRONMENT 
This Artfole has implicitly accepted the argument that the present 
Code should not extend to the corporate adviser since it was 
designed for the lawyer serving as an advocate.105 Historically, that 
argument is indeed well founded. The Code draws heavily from 
Judge Sharswood's original work, which, in turn, was based upon 
the then-accurate view of the lawyer as participant in an adversary 
process. Since Judge Sharswood's time, however, society has, 
through the adoption of volumes of laws, moved more and more to-
ward governmental regulation of private enterprise. As lawyers in-
creasingly are called upon to advise on and assist in compliance with 
those laws, it can no longer be said that the typical lawyer is a litiga-
tor. 
Still, it is neither fruitful nor fully accurate to assert that the 
Code, because not designed for corporate advisers, is irrelevant to 
them. Though the adviser cannot entirely share the orientation of the 
advocate, the corporate adviser not infrequently operates in a con-
text that has many adversarial characteristics. In arguing for the con-
currence of the SEC staff in an interpretation of the securities laws, 
for example, the corporate lawyer seems clearly to be an advocate. 
While good practice requires that all pertinent facts be disclosed so 
that the "concurrence" of the staff will be meaningful, the lawyer 
seems clearly entitled to avoid discussion of legally irrelevant facts 
that might adversely influence the staff, and he certainly may argue 
for a statutory interpretation favorable to the client. Other examples 
easily come to mind. In a public offering with a firm underwriting, 
counsel to the issuer is clearly in a position adverse to that of the 
underwriter's counsel, since it is the underwriter who is purchasing 
the securities. In an acquisition or merger, it is typically true that 
there are two opposing parties each represented by counsel. Cer-
tainly such adversarial interests are not always present in the work of 
corporate advisers, and there is no question that they operate outside 
the adversarial system of justice upon which the Code primarily fo-
cuses. But in establishing standards for the corporate adviser, it is 
wrong to assume that advice is given free from adversarial consider-
ations.106 
105. For support for this argument, see, e.g., articles cited in note 14 supra. 
106. It is quite difficult to define "adviser'' and "advocate" in a way that satisfactorily 
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Thus, though corporate advisers do not participate directly in the 
adversary system, it is inaccurate to view them as entirely isolated 
from it. By and large, corporate advisers practice in partnerships 
with lawyers who do serve in a traditional adversarial capacity. In-
deed, it is not unusual for lawyers to perform both functions. That 
the adviser or the adviser's partners are fully a part of the traditional 
adversary system is an important consideration that seems largely to 
have been ignored. 
Assume, arguendo, that we accept some notion of public disclo-
sure obligation for the lawyer as "adviser." What priorities do we 
establish for the law firm serving as adviser in the preparation of a 
registration statement and also representing the client in adversary 
activities? If, in the course of litigation, the firm learns of harmful 
though not conclusive evidence that is material and that, if discov-
ered by the opponent, will dramatically and adversely affect pending 
litigation, is the firm's duty of confidentiality growing out of the liti-
gation superseded by its duty to disclose material facts in the regis-
tration statement? Can the firm satisfy its obligations by simply 
withdrawing from the latter representation? Was it improper for the 
firm to handle both ~rporate and litigation matters, given that the 
conflict would not have arisen if the firm next door were handling 
the lawsuit? What about a potential dispute over a tax deduction 
taken by the corporation that may be disallowed if the IRS becomes 
cognizant of it-assuming, for present purposes, that tax counsel 
does not yet have a disclosure obligation to the IRS as representative 
of the public? And what about the distributorship agreement in 
which the distributor was represented vigorously by counsel who did 
not notice a potential antitrust problem-assuming here that there is 
no obligation of disclosure to the Department of Justice or the Fed-
eral Trade Commission? And what if the disclosure conflict relates 
to a matter in which the firm is representing the corporation, or its 
differentiates between the two for purposes of this analysis. The Code definitions are clearly 
inadequate: "an advocate ... deals with past conduct and must take the facts as he finds 
them. By contrast, a lawyer serving as adviser primarily assists his client in determining the 
course of future conduct and relationships." CODE, supra note I, EC 7-3. That distinction, 
however, ignores the sense of an adversary process that is key to our view of the role of an 
advocate. Moreover, a few practical examples make clear that it is not the right distinction. A 
lawyer drafting a disclosure document certainly takes ''the facts as he finds them" but is hardly 
in the position of an advocate. A lawyer negotiating an agreement in settlement of litigation is 
primarily determining the course of future conduct, yet he seems clearly to be an "advocate" 
for purposes of a determination of professional responsibilities. Probably the best definition is 
that an advocate is one who represents a client in or in connection with a contested pending or 
probable legal proceeding. Thus, a lawyer arguing with an administrative agency about an 
interpretation of a law or regulation is an advocate if the determination is made in the context 
of a "legal proceeding," which is admittedly an ambiguous term. A lawyer negotiating a 
merger, even though both parties are represented, would not be an "advocate." 
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president, in a criminal matter? Corporations may not be able to 
avail themselves of the privilege against self-incrimination, 107 but it 
would appear that they have a right to counsel,108 and to subject 
counsel to such pressures may be unconstitutional. 
The questions are obviously endless and not fully answerable. 
However, their very existence provides an answer of sorts: it is sim-
ply impractical, unfair, and improper within the current legal envi-
ronment to saddle the securities lawyer-or other corporate legal 
adviser-with affirmative disclosure obligations. These lawyers can 
certainly advise disclosure, but to require them to insist upon it, 
whether directly or through the leverage of withholding opinions, 
creates irreconcilable conflicts with other clear obligations. More-
over, to grant a priority to the disclosure obligation threatens to sub-
vert the adversary system of justice as long as the legal profession is 
organized as it presently is. 
Must we, then, abandon any notion of public responsibility ex-
cept in the extreme case of known fraud? Of course not. What we 
must do is either abandon much of that developing notion or reorder 
the legal environment. Either choice will require affirmative action, 
however, for the Code simply fails to provide adequate guidance. 
IV. RATIONAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FUTURE 
A. A Comparison of the Alternatives 
There are two rational alternatives: the lawyer as autonomous 
adviser and the lawyer as confidant. In a real sense the division be-
tween those two approaches is not as absolute as it may seem, for 
even the lawyer as confidant remains independent to the extent tra-
ditionally required by the Code. Recognizing the importance of the 
confidential role in no way releases advisers from Judge Shar-
swood's demand that they remain true to the dictates of conscience 
· and resist complete deferral to the wishes of the client.109 Without 
question it remains important under either alternative that the law-
yer maintain the highest standards of integrity. The distinction be-
101. See California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 55 (1974); Hale v. Henkel, 201 
U.S. 43, 74-75 (1906). 
108. See Avco Delta Corp. Canada v. United States, 540 F.2d 258 (7th Cir. 1976); Vander-
see v. United States, 321 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1963). Henkel explains the lack of fifth amendment 
privilege as based in the corporation's existence as a creature of the state, without the natural 
rights of natural persons, 201 U.S. at 74-75, an explanation that would not carry over to the 
right to counsel, which serves societal interests. 
109. See text at note 10 supra. 
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tween the alternatives lies in their respective definitions of the 
lawyer's proper role in appraising and responding to client behavior. 
With the complexity of the modem regulatory framework, many 
client-proposed activities are neither clearly legal nor clearly illegal. 
Conclusions on compliance with the law require substantial edu-
cated judgment, and the legal adviser's task is often to evalute the 
risk that a proposed course of action, if challenged, will be found to 
have been improper. And, since the cost of mounting a defense may 
itself be sufficient to deter a proposed activity, the legal adviser may 
instead be asked simply to gauge the likelihood that a challenge will 
be brought. In this context, assigning the adviser the autonomous ar 
the confidential function will produce different consequences along 
the spectrum of activities on which he or she may advise. 
As an indication of that generalization, let us consider, although 
quantification is obviously something of a fiction, three situations 
with varying and specific probabilities of legality. In Case 1 the ad-
viser concludes that there is a 40% chance that a given public disclo-
sure is legally required, in Case 2 a 50% chance and in Case 3 a 60% 
chance. In all three cases both the autonomous adviser and the confi-
dant should no doubt urge disclosure, but remain alert to legitimate 
reasons for nondisclosure. In Cases 1 and 2, there will probably be 
no difference between the behavior of the autonomous adviser and 
the confidant if efforts to obtain disclosure prove fruitless, since even 
the autonomous adviser, while regarding disclosure as better, likely 
cannot conclude that it must be made. no In Case 3, however, sub-
. stantial differences arise. In that situation, the autonomous adviser, 
sitting in the position of judge, would conclude that the disclosure is 
required, and accordingly he would have a duty to compel disclo-
sure, even in the manner suggested by paragraph 48(i) of the Na-
tional Student Marketing complaint. The confidant, on the other 
hand, certainly could not initiate disclosure and properly should not 
attempt to prevent the client's activity by resigning the representa-
110. The obligation that would be imposed here is unclear. There is a useful analogy to be 
seen in the accounting debate of recent years. In that context the SEC has adopted a require-
ment in Instruction H(f) of Form 10-Q that when a change in accounting methods is made, the 
independent accountant must file a letter stating whether, in his judgment, the change is an 
alternative preferable to the prior method. Securities Act of 1933 Releases No. 5549 (Dec. 19, 
1974), 5 SEC DOCKET 727, 731 (1974), and 5611 (Sept. 10, 1975), 7 SEC DOCKET 816, 823 
(1975). The accounting profession has objected to that procedure, however, primarily on the 
ground that, of two "acceptable" methods of accounting, the determination of which is "pref-
erable" for a particular firm in a particular industry is a highly subjective judgment and not 
easily made. See Securities Act of 1933 Releases No. 5729 and 5729A (July 27, 1976), 10 SEC 
DocKET 99, 142 (1976); The Public Accounting Profession and Its Critics 23, 25 (1976) (pro-
ceedings of a conference held at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, May 25, 
1976). 
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tion or otherwise. As the likelihood of illegality increases and as the 
perceived significance of the matter increases, the confidant would 
eventually have an obligation to resign, the turning point coming 
when the confidant concludes, without reasonable doubt, that to 
continue would be to participate in fraud. But self-initiated disclo-
sure cannot be permitted except in the most unusual cases, for if the 
lawyer is a confidant, it is because we perceive an importance in con-
fidentiality and its fruits that outweighs the autonomous function. 
Additionally, it must be recognized that the choice of roles leads 
to a more subtle result. The autonomous adviser, sitting as judge and 
inherently having less of a sense of client loyalty, is probably more 
likely to conclude that action is required contrary to that desired by 
the client. In the general disclosure situation, for example, the law 
remains unclear on when and whether issuance of a press release is 
required. Currently, it is possible to conclude that-assuming there 
is no trading by insiders or "tippees"-a corporation is required to 
issue a·press release upon the occurrence of a material event unless 
there is a legitimate business reason for nondisclosure. 111 If the au-
tonomous adviser and the confidant both view the law that way, it 
nevertheless is true that the autonomous adviser will be less inclined 
to accept the legitimacy of a business reason for nondisclosure. Thus, 
if Case 1 above involved a press release, it is likely that the confidant 
would perceive the probability that disclosure is required by law as 
being less than 40%, the autonomous adviser as more than 40%. In a 
world where any given disclosure affects many competing inter-
ests-those of the corporation as well as of its creditors, its share-
holders, persons contemplating purchases or sales of its securities, 
and its competitors, to name a few-it is not obvious which sort of 
bias society should desire the corporate adviser to possess. 
B. An Evaluation 
In light of the diverse interests involved, it is clear that we as a 
society can decide how advisers should behave only by attempting to 
evaluate the costs and benefits of the alternative roles. What follows, 
therefore, is an analysis of how the lawyer as autonomous adviser 
would differ from the lawyer as confidant. 
ll I. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 850 n.12 (2d Cir. 1968), cerl. 
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); SEC v. Shattuck Denn Mining Corp., 297 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y. 
1968). 
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Let it be admitted that the title of this subsection is misleading. A 
common reaction to the National Student Marketing complaint was 
to claim that lawyers were being charged with the sort of independ-
ent public duties properly belonging to certified public account-
ants.112 The accounting profession, however, has not by any means 
admitted that it is responsible to the public in general rather than to 
clients, 113 and the growing recognition of an accountant-client confi-
dentiality privilege in state law114 lends some support to that posi-
tion. However, it is fair to suggest that the common perception of the 
accountant's duty is that it is primarily public in nature, and cer-
tainly the accountant's duty is more nearly public than is the tradi-
tional duty of the lawyer. 
But a public duty for advisers certainly could be adopted by a 
rational society; there is nothing inherently wrong with a structure in 
which they would have such obligations. The societal advantage of 
this publicly oriented role is that it gives substantial, independent 
authority to the talented minds that participate in the advisory pro-
cess. In effect, it recruits for public use all that talent that Justices 
Douglas115 and Stonell6 so long ago saw as being employed for anti-
public purposes. And, while that thought may suggest to some an 
invasion of the corporate boardroom by quasi-governmental spies, it 
must be acknowledged that accountants, with at least a relatively 
greater public duty, have escaped being viewed in that way. Indeed, 
social and professional relationships between accountants and their 
clients appear as harmonious as those between lawyers and their cli-
ents. 
112. See generally s. GOLDBERG (ed.), EXPANDING RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE SECU-
RITIES LAWS (1973); ABA National Institute, supra note 40, at 91. 
113. See Hicks, The Role of the Auditor in .Disclosure, in .Disclosure: Benefits and Problems, 
background papers, The Third Seaview Symposium 194 (1974) (arguing that CPAs should be 
independent of both client and general public); AICPA, Statement of Auditing Standards No. 
20 at f 8 (discussing the question of disclosing control weaknesses only to management, not 
whether they should be disclosed to the public). But see Axelson, Critique, in .Disclosure: 
Benefits and Problems, suprtr, Wiesen, The Cohen Commission Report: A Perspective on .Disclo-
sure Regulation, J. ACCOUNTANCY, Aug. 1977, at 90; Carmichael, The Auditor's Role and 
Responsibilities, J. ACCOUNTANCY, Aug. 1977, at 55; A Wider Look at 'What CPA's .Do, Bus. 
WEEK, Jan. 30, 1978, at 71. 
114. Fifteen states or territories currently recognize an accountant-client privilege. 8 WIG-
MORE ON EVIDENCE 533 n.22 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) & 1975 Supp. at 72. , 
115. Douglas, .Directors 'Who .Do Not .Direct, 47 HARV. L. REv. 1305, 1329 (1934). 
I 16. Stone, The Public I,yluence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV. I (1934). The article reprints 
the address given by Justice Stone on the occasion of the dedication of the Michigan Law 
Quadrangle. 
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For lawyers, an important advantage of the independent model is 
that it provides a relatively clear definition of their responsibilities 
and thus rescues them from the current schizophrenia. In essence, 
the autonomous adviser would serve as an investigative reporter, de-
termining that all relevant documents and data have been obtained 
and reviewed and then preparing the document for which he or she 
has been hired. At the conclusion of the investigation, an appropriate 
opinion would be delivered. 
But while that concept might quickly be accepted, it must be rec-
ognized that its realization would not be easy. If this public function 
is to be served, some mechanism would have to be developed that 
would cause corporations to retain autonomous advisers. At present, 
the required role of the lawyer in securities disclosure documents is 
quite limited. A corporation need not use a lawyer to prepare any of 
its disclosure documents, and, unless there is good reason for a cor-
poration to avail itself of an autonomous adviser's services, many 
corporations would not do so. Two mechanisms appear feasible to 
implement the autonomous adviser system. The first, and less intru-
sive, is not really a "mechanism" in the usual sense: the market, 
through the bank and brokerage community, might demand that a 
corporation associate autonomous counsel as a condition precedent 
to receiving external financing. In many respects that is the current 
practice with municipal bond issuances, and it is for that reason that 
municipal bond legal opinions tend to be given by a relatively small 
number of firms. The bonds simply will not be salable without the 
legal opinion of one of those recognized firms. The second and more 
direct method would be to require by statute or regulation that cer-
tain documents be reviewed by autonomous legal advisers. 117 
Assuming that corporations are effectively compelled to use au-
tonomous legal advisers, a more detailed definition of "autonomy" is 
required. It would seem clear that inside counsel could not be auton-
omous, and so whatever documents require such counsel could not 
_be prepared by inside counsel alone. Similarly, the impossibility of 
maintaining a public responsibility and a simultaneous client-ori-
ented confidential relationship dictates that the autonomous adviser 
117. At present, the only required involvement of lawyers in the disclosure process relates 
to an opinion about the legality of an issue of stock. It is suggested in item 23 of Schedule A 
and item 12 of Schedule B, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1976), under the 1933 Act, and reflected in most 
pertinent forms for registration under the 1933 Act. In practice, of course, lawyer involvement 
in the preparation of most disclosure documents is far more extensive, although it remains true 
that many of the current reporting forms under the 1934 Act-e.g., forms 10-K (annual re• 
port), 10-Q (quarterly report), and 8-K (periodic report)-are often prepared with relatively 
little lawyer involvement. 
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and his firm not perform many services for clients other than the 
preparation of documents requiring the autonomous adviser's opin-
ion. 118 Given the confidential nature of the information that be-
comes available in litigation and the lawyer's obligations in that 
context, it would appear that autonomous counsel should be prohib-
ited from representing the publicly held client in any litigation.119 As 
to matters of·a less sensitive nature, such as business planning, con-
tract negotiation and drafting, and tax advice, where it might be ar-
gued that confidentiality plays a less critical role, it seems possible 
that the conflict would not be such as to destroy autonomy. Certainly 
that is the general view of the accounting firms that perform similar 
services for their clients. However, accountants continually debate 
these questions, 120 and, with the luxury of writing on a clean slate, it 
may be that all activities performed by lawyers should be catego-
rized as either adversary or advisory in nature, and the autonomous 
adviser-with public responsibilities-should be permitted to per-
form only advisory services. If the autonomous model gains accept-
ance, it is reasonable to expect that tax advice and some other quasi-
adversary functions would eventually be shifted into the advisory 
column. It should be even clearer that the autonomous legal adviser 
must not be director or shareholder of the client. 
It would also be useful to establish mechanisms to protect auton-
omy. Again, we may look to the accounting profession for guidance. 
In that context, the SEC requires issuers that replace auditors to no-
tify the Commission in a public report121 and to advise it of any 
disagreements regarding disclosure within the past two years; the 
discharged accounting firm must also review that report and confirm 
its views to the SEC. Similarly, the SEC requires that the client not 
be in substantial debt to its auditors, since that obviously could re-
I 18. Similar problems continue to plague the independent accounting profession. See Se-
curities Act of 1933 Release No. 5869 (Sept. 26, 1977), [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. 
L. REP. (CCH) ~ 81,306. See also Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 5270 (July 5, 1972), 
relating to doubts about the independence of auditors from clients resulting from family rela-
tionships, financial interests, business relationships, creditor relationships, occupations with 
conflicting interests, interests as counsel to clients, interests as a broker-dealer, and the per-
formance of bookkeeping services. 
I 19. The only alternative, some form of "Chinese Wall," is simply not satisfactory. See 
The Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, [1977-1978 Transfer 
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 96,237 (2d Cir. 1977). But see Hunsicker, Conflicts of 
Interest, Economic .Distortions, and the Separation of Trust and Commercial Banking Functions, 
50 S. CAL. L. REv. 611, 634-47 (1977) (advocating "Chinese Wall" between commercial and 
trust departments of larger banks to avoid illegitimate use of information). 
120. See note 118 supra. 
121. The requirement is contained in Item 4 of Form 8-K, adopted pursuant to Section 13 
of the 1934 Act, 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (1977). See also Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 5868 
(Sept. 26, 1977) [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 81,305. 
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duce independence.122 If these provisions are necessary in the ac-
counting field, where the dominance of the larger firms creates an 
inherently less dependent structure, they should certainly be mini-
11:1um requirements for the autonomous branch of the legal profes-
sion, given that there is no basis to anticipate that it will soon 
develop similar centralization. 
The foregoing is a brief analysis of the types of structural change 
necessary to create a workable autonomous legal advisory profes-
sion. It may well be that a separate branch of the ABA should also 
be formed foi: such firms, much as the AICPA is establishing a 
branch for accountants who audit publicly held firms, 123 since the 
concerns and aims of autonomous advisers would be very different 
in nature from those of traditional lawyers. Certainly if the autono-
mous path is the one we choose to walk, a much more precise codifi-
cation of the meaning of autonomy and of the duties and 
responsibilities of the autonomous adviser is required. 
Ultimately, what this separation of the functions of adviser and 
advocate suggests is something akin to the separation in the English 
bar between barristers and solicitors. While that separation was es-
tablished without any thought to the conflicts that the present sug-
gestion seeks to eliminate, it is at least worthy of note that this 
"radical" proposal has an historical antecedent in the very source of 
our concept of a system of law.124 
2. The Lawyer as Co,ifidant 
In contrast to implementing the role of autonomous adviser, no 
new trail need be cut to retain, or perhaps to readopt, the role of 
confidant for the legal adviser. Though it may be necessary to re-
mark the road and possibly to remove a few weeds, its outlines re-
main those of the present Code. 
The confidential adviser serves the client-and society-through 
advice and, to the extent possible, persuasion based on an analysis of 
the law and its progress. Some would criticize that role as being 
merely diagnostic, as placing the modem adviser in a position where 
122. Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 5270 (July 5, 1972) at 8: "When the fees for an 
audit or other professional service remain unpaid over an extended period and become mate-
rial in relation to the current audit fee, it may raise questions concerning the accountant's 
independence .... [N]ormally the fees for the prior year's audit should be paid prior to the 
commencement of the current engagement." 
123. See note 150 infra. 
124. One relevant distinction is that in the English system barristers cannot receive fees for 
serving on the board of directors of a client corporation, while solicitors suffer no such inhibi-
tion. See B. HOLLANDER, THE ENGLISH BAR: A PRIESTHOOD 41-42, 67 (1964). 
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the client is the "keeper of the attorney's professional conscience." 
Indeed, that perception of the corporate adviser's function may well 
lie at the heart of current attacks upon confidentiality and the corre-
sponding push for autonomy. 
Such analysis, however, fails to recognize that the role of the cor-
porate adviser is not merely to advise whether a particular course of 
conduct is likely to survive a challenge under the present law. He is 
also to come to conclusions about the direction in which the law will 
move. The facts that culminated in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor .Drug 
Stores125 fook place as early as seven years before the decision. 
Those of Ernst &-Ernst v. H ochfelder126 preceded the decision by at 
least ten years. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. was before the courts 
for fourteen years prior to its conclusion. 127 Under such circum-
stances, the adviser must always have a sense of movement in the 
law, a sense based to some degree upon fundamental notions of how 
the law ought to develop and of what society, through its judges or 
administrative agencies, will at a future date determine to be fair or 
unfair, proper or improper. In that regard, the lawyer does not ad-
vise only as an,individual or bring only an individual sense of right 
to the appraisal of corporate behavior. To the extent that society's 
conscience is or, within the attorney's predictive ability, will be man-
ifested in its laws, the confidential adviser brings that conscience to 
bear on the actions of the corporate client. 
If that function of expressing the societal conscience is to be re-
tained, confidentiality must be protected, though for reasons other 
than those involved with the adversary context. Confidentiality is es-
sential to the advocate because the advocate exists to represent the 
client in the traditional sense by speaking, acting, and arguing on his 
behalf. The adversary system assumes that justice will result from 
the clash of opposing representatives in a court of law, a conception 
that is indefensible unless the advocates have at their command all 
information known to their respective clients. Confidentiality is nec-
essary to protect the free flow of information without which the ad-
vocate cannot perform the assigned function. 
Similar needs are not present in the advisory context, for the ad-
viser does not represent the client or argue the client's case. The ad-
v1ser quite simply assists the client in selecting and carrying out a 
course of behavior. As noted above, it is peculiar to the legal ad-
125. 421 U.S. 723 (1975). 
126. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
127. 552 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977). See Lorne, A Reappraisal of 
Fair Shares in Controlled Mergers, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1978). 
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viser's function that that assistance necessarily involves perceptions 
of societal conscience. But the adviser cannot accurately articulate 
the societal conscience without knowledge of facts. To return to the 
example of the press release, "insider" purchases may well have a 
bearing on conclusions about whether an item is material. 128 But, 
since these purchases may also increase the risk of individual and 
corporate liability, the adviser may hesitate to ask such questions or 
at least not expect honest answers unless there can be an assurance of 
confidentiality. Thus, although the needs for a free flow of informa-
tion and thus the justifications for confidentiality differ markedly in 
the adversary and advisory contexts, protection of confidentiality is 
necessary if corporate advisers are to serve the function of articulat-
ing the societal conscience.129 
3. The Critical Additional Factor 
It should be clear, then, that a rational society might choose that 
corporate advisers serve in either an autonomous or a confidential 
capacity. It should also be clear that the two functions are incompat-
ible and that, if corporate lawyers are directed to be autonomous, 
their role as corporate conscience will be destroyed. Indeed, the pub-
lic value of an autonomous adviser will, to a large extent, depend on 
the ability of society to deceive clients into believing that they have a 
confidential relationship with their legal advisers. 
An even stronger reason for discarding the autonomous model is 
that the choice between roles must be considered not in isolation, but 
in the context of the corporate world. In that world, one profession 
already approximates the autonomous model, and unless we are 
somehow convinced that lawyers are better investigators than ac-
countants, or more intelligent or more honest than accountants, or 
deal in areas not considered by accountants, or that accountants 
themselves are not expected to be autonomous, it makes little sense 
to push both professions toward autonomy. The advantage of two 
autonomous professions over one cannot compensate for the loss of 
confidentiality. 
Although many commentators have observed and apparently en-
dorsed the parallel movement of accountants and lawyers toward 
128. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851 (2d Cir. 1968), cert, 
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). 
129. The value of the corporate adviser's ability to obtain the confidence of the client is 
discussed in Chief Judge Lumbard's dissent in United States v. Tellier, 255 F.2d 441, 451 (2d 
Cir. 1958). Such concerns did not seem to perturb the Tellier majority, however. 
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autonomy, 130 the development is fundamentally ill-conceived. We 
are not dealing simply with "professionals," but r~ther with two dis-
tinct professions. There is no reason that both should serve the same 
or even similar functions; if that were a goal, we could save consider-
able duplication by removing lawyers from the disclosure process. 
Accountants are already well versed in it, and their familiarity with 
disclosure principles is unquestionably greater than lawyers' famili-
arity with accounting principles arid auditing standards. 
Against that background, the argument against autonomy for the 
legal adviser becomes compelling. In essence, that shift in roles 
duplicates existing services while destroying the lawyer's ability to 
function as corporate conscience-and, absent psychosis or the phe-
nomenon of para praxis, a conscience has no ability to initiate disclo-
sure. Furthermore, to adopt the current trend and to assert 
independent obligations on a confidential relationship is deception 
without purpose. It is to tell clients that they can repose confidence 
in their lawyers and yet to tell lawyers not to respect those confi-
dences. It will work only so long as both lawyers and clients are 
fooled. When it is finally understood that confidentiality has been 
lost, clients will no longer permit information to flow to their law-
yers, and conscientious l~wyers will not seek to obtain it. The lawyer, 
then, will be left as a relatively autonomous figure in an environ-
ment in which that autonomy cannot properly function. And with 
the adviser in that ambiguous role, the traditional lawyering efforts 
of his litigating partners will suffer significantly from restrictions on 
the flow of information. 
130. See, e.g., Lowenfels, Expanding Public Responsibilities of Securities Lawyers: An Anal-
ysis of the New Trend in Standard of Care and Priorities of ./Julies, 14 CoLUM. L. REV. 412 
(1974). 
It is at least of historical interest that the SEC in the past has not only recognized, but has 
seemingly endorsed, separate roles for accountants and lawyers. In American Fin. Co., 40 SEC. 
DEC. & REP. 1043, 1049 (1962), the SEC stated: 
Though owing a public responsibility, an attorney in acting as the client's advisor, de-
fender, advocate and confidant enters into a personal relationship in which his principal 
concern is with the interests and rights of his client. The requirement of the Act of certifi-
cation by an independent accountant, on the other hand, is intended to secure for the 
benefit of public investors the detached objectivity of a disinterested person. 
In that case, the SEC determined that a person who served as counsel to a corporation was not, 
for the reasons expressed, sufficiently independent to be its accountant; the view was seem-
ingly rea!Tmned as recently as 1972. See Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 5270 (July 5, 
1972). 
The SEC has urged client loyalty when one of its own lawyers left to join the private sector, 
arguing for the required confidentiality of information he obtained while counsel for the SEC. 
U.S. v. Mahaney, 27 F. Supp. 463 (N.D. Cal. 1939). 
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V. THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ADVISORIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
The preceding portions of this Article have dealt with the ques-
tion whether society is better served by the corporate legal adviser's 
serving in an autonomous or in a confidential capacity. The author's 
conviction should be obvious: the confidential role is important and 
should not be. eroded; countervailing needs of society are adequately 
served through other existing means. Whether or not that conclusion 
is accepted, however, the preceding analysis should make clear to all 
that there is, a need to establish a body of ethical precepts for the 
conduct of the corporate adviser. The Code, with its unquestionably 
adversarial birthright, is simply inadequate to that task. 131 Accord-
ingly, this Article now addresses some of the more critical elements 
of a Code of Professional Advisorial Responsibility-the needed 
codification of standards relevant to the practice of the corporate le-
gal adviser. 
This portion of the Article does not purport to consider the entire 
body of standards properly applicable to the conduct of the corpo-
rate legal adviser, for that is properly the task of a diversified group 
of minds capable of representing a more general consensus. How-
ever, there are some particularly critical elements of the relationship 
between adviser and client that may properly be considered at this 
juncture. Specifically, this section of the Article addresses several 
crucial concerns: the question of who properly speaks for the client 
to its adviser-i.e., the question of who "is" the corporate client; the 
question of what, if any, restrictions should apply to the acceptance 
of clients or to the acceptance of limited engagements; the extent to 
which the corporate adviser's confidentiality obligation should be 
recognized in the face of conflicting societal interests; and the duty of 
the corporate adviser to avoid improper alignments with the client. 
In designing the Code of Professional Advisorial Responsibility, 
it must be recognized that we need not write upon a blank slate. 
While the present Code does not sufficiently illuminate the duties of 
the adviser, it is true that the role of the adviser and the relationships 
between advisers and their clients have developed against a back-
ground in which the present Code and its ancestors were the only 
bases for the determination of duties. Consequently, it should not be 
surprising if many of the duties expressed in the Code are compara-
ble to what society expects of its advisers. Additionally, it should not 
131. See also Cheek, Professional Responsibility and Se!f-Regulalion of /he Securities 
Lawyer, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 597 (1975); Shipman, The Need for SEC Rules To Govern the 
.Duties and Civil Liabilities of Allorneys Under the Federal Securities Laws, 34 Omo ST. L.J, 231 
(1973). 
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go unsaid that the first task in the preparation of a new code such as 
that proposed here is the drafting of a careful preamble that should, 
inter a!ia, clearly distinguish between when a member of the bar is 
serving as an adversary and when he is serving as an adviser. 
A. Who Speaks for the Client? 
The inadequacy of the definition in the present Code-that the 
corporate client is the entity itself.-has already been discussed. 132 
The problem is that the difficult questions in this area most often 
arise when there is a perceived difference between the interests of the 
entity and the interests of persons related to it. Those latter interests 
may, in some instances, be sufficiently connected to the entity to 
present an argument that the persons interested in them should be 
viewed as the client. In National Student Marketing, for example, 
concern was with the rights of shareholders, the owners of the enter-
prise in the historical view. It is easy in such a case to argue that the 
shareholders are really the client. But the public nature of the share-
holders is such that accepting them as the client renders a confiden-
tial relationship with the attorney impossible. And, indeed, it takes 
no more than a review of the facts of Ferguson to realize that the 
position of the SEC in such cases does not view shareholders as cli-
ents, since the duties of the attorneys asserted in that case ran to 
persons who were merely potential-not even present-holders of 
debt securities. 
If, then, we are left, as the present Code properly argues, with the 
"entity" as the client, who is to speak for it? If the lawyer is counsel 
to the entity, with whom does the lawyer consult, to whom are ques-
tions to be addressed, from whom are responses to be accepted? The 
immediate answer is the board of directors or persons properly dele-
gated by it, but that is certainly not acceptable in all instances. 
Though it is probably permissible for the lawyer to rely generally on 
the board, the existence of-or the lawyer's perception of-an actual 
or potential conflict between the board members and the interests 
that might be ascribed to the corporate entity133 should qualify that 
reliance. Thus, for example, when measures are proposed that make 
acquisition of the corporation more difficult, consideration should 
be given to requiring, as an ethical standard, that the lawyer request, 
or even insist upon threat of withdrawal, that a committee of the 
132. See text at notes 19-20 supra. 
133. See also March, Relations with Management and Individual Financial Interests 
(Background paper for ABA Airlie House Conference on Ethical Responsibilities of Corporate 
Lawyers, June 9-11, 1977), subsequently published in 33 Bus. LAW 1227 (1978). 
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board consisting of persons not otherwise affiliated with the corpora-
tion be established to advise counsel.134 To the extent feasible within 
the board's membership, that committee should be free from the in-
fluence of any executive or substantial shareholder. 
Of course, it should be recognized that the conflict that would 
demand appointment of such a special committee cannot involve 
simply differences of opinion between the board and the lawyer on 
what is "right," for the corporate adviser has no more divine inspira-
tion than did Judge Sharswood's advocate. 135 Rather, the lawyer's 
responsibility should be limited to a determination of whether the 
board, or its designee, or one of its members has some interest apart 
from those of the entity that, in the judgment of a reasonable person, 
would likely affect decisions on corporate behavior. 
illustratively, consider the question of corporate perquisites. To 
date, attention has focused primarily on whether such perquisites 
must be recognized as a form of remuneration either for disclosure136 
or income taxation 137 purposes. However, it is often difficult to draw 
the line between what is a legitimate corporate expenditure for non-
compensatory business purposes and what is effectively an addi-
tional form of management compensation. Assume that the law is 
simply unclear on whether a particular payment for an activity of the 
chief executive officer is a form of remuneration and therefore must 
be disclosed. Under such circumstances, the officer, who may have 
personal and economic motivations differing from those of the cor-
poration, should not be permitted to determine the answer to the 
disclosure question. But the adviser should be entitled-and even re-
quired-to accept the determination of an informed, independent 
board of directors, even if the adviser harbors a personal view that 
such expenditures should not only be disclosed, but abolished out-
134. Cf. Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208 (1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 
(CCH) ~ 96,282 (2d Cir. 1978) (discussing the role of independent directors of mutual funds 
and the problems inherent in defining "independence"). 
It is particularly important to bear in mind certain pertinent considerations. First, the ques-
tion is not who is the client, but who speaks for it. When the focus of inquiry is on the lo<;us of 
authority, and not on many of the other questions that attend attorney-client relationships, 
those other questions should not be permitted to cloud the analysis. That is, even though the 
present Code is entirely correct in asserting that the entity itself is the client, the attorney still 
needs a reasoned basis by which to judge from whom he should accept direction. Absent a 
conflict-as to the existence of which the adviser has an obligation to be particularly sensi-
tive-the board of directors, including its designees, should be seen as clearly filling that role. 
135. See G. SHARSwooo, supra note 6, at 26. 
136. See authorities cited in note 22 supra. 
137. See, e.g., R.T. Armantrout v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 996 (1977); Halperin, Business 
.Deductions for Personal Living Expenses: A Uniform Approach lo an Unsolved Problem, 122 U. 
PA. L. REV. 859 (1974). 
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right. If the payments involved the entire board, however, such as a 
program reimbursing all board members for certain expenses, the 
analysis advanced above suggests that the program's adoption and 
the question of disclosure should be considered and passed upon by 
an external committee made up of persons who are not board mem-
bers. Though counsel would have the authority-indeed, the respon-
sibility-to express views contrary to those of the committee, he 
should not be allowed to insist either that his views be adopted or 
that they be aired publicly. In an unclear case, the ultimate decision 
is not counsel's to make. 
The appointment of such external committees to direct counsel is 
not, of course, a mechanism envisioned or even authorized by cur-
rent state laws.138 Indeed, the special committee would not have the 
legal authority to bind the corporation, and any of its recommenda-
tions or decisions would have to be adopted by the corporation 
through proc~sses appropriate under applicable state law. Even so, 
the mechanism, if adopted by the organized bar, would operate in 
relatively efficient fashion to provide the corporate adviser with gui-
dance about the desires of the speechless entity. The solution is not, 
perhaps, completely satisfactory, but it is a reasonable means to a 
necessary end. 139 · 
B. The Acceptance of Representation 
1. The Acceptance of Clients 
Some of the recent developments discussed earlier in this Article 
suggest that a notion may be evolving that counsel should not accept 
some kinds of clients or some limited engagements. As to the former, 
the trend toward rejection of disreputable clients can be seen in the. 
Ferguson and National Student Marketing settlements, both of which 
138. But c.f. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 145(d) (providing for opinion of independent counsel as a 
prerequisite to indemnification of officers or directors under certain circumstances when there 
is a conflict within the board). 
139. A related problem not addressed in the text is how the difficulty in determining who 
is the client affects the attorney-client privilege. It has been held that under some circum-
stances the corporation may not claim the privilege in litigation with its own shareholders, the 
persons to whom financial statements might be considered primarily addressed. Gamer v. 
Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 _(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971). See generally 
Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Corporation in Shareholder Litigation, 50 S. CAL. L. 
REv.303 (1977). Garner does not, however, stand for the proposition that there is no privilege 
with a corporation or even for the more limited proposition that the privilege can never prevail 
as against shareholders. It simply holds that, under some circumstances, when shareholders 
challenge actions of the corporation they own, they may be able to discover communications 
with counsel. As to the propriety of representing both a corporation and its directors in a 
shareholders' derivative action, see Messing v. FDI, (1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. 
REP.~ 96,217 (D.N.J. 1977), and cases discussed therein. 
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required an investigation of potential clients prior to accepting their 
representation. Those settlements do not conflict in general with the 
current position of the practicing lawyer: most lawyers who are eco-
nomically able to be selective consider it unwise, if not unprofes-
sional, to accept representation of a disreputable client. 140 Indeed, 
the recent experience is such that any corporate legal adviser must be 
fearful of such clients, since it appears that the lawyer will likely be 
subject to investigation, if not sanction, if the client raises the wrath 
of the authorities. 
The question whether disreputable corporate clients are entitled 
to good legal advice does not, of course, rise to the systemic dimen-
sions achieved by the question whether such clients could be denied 
representation in litigation. Yet, it is an important issue involving 
important societal considerations. When the agreement to investigate 
clients prior to accepting representation is imposed by the Commis-
sion in a settlement, as it was in Ferguson and National Student 
Marketing, a suggestion surfaces that disfavored clients either should 
be denied the benefit of counsel or should be required to engage 
lawyers who are unaware of or unconcerned with their purported 
obligations. It is conceivable that the SEC's intent is less suspicious, 
aiming simply either to prevent disfavored clients from engaging in 
activities that require lawyers or to require that extraordinary care 
be given to such clients. If either of those is the goal of such provi-
sions, however, reality is being ignored and extra-legal penalties are 
being imposed on the disfavored. But whatever their purpose, such 
procedures raise severe questions of due process.141 
From a broader perspective, these procedures also make it im-
portant to question whether society is not better served if even the 
disreputable clients have access to principled counsel. Certainly it 
will occasionally happen-as it should-that better counsel will en-
able the client to achieve ends legally that some might view as unde-
sirable-the popular, overused, misused and no longer meaningful 
phrase is "find a loophole." But if the law as written by society does 
not prevent the achievement of such ends, society has itself to blame, 
not those who rely upon its rules. More important, as often as better 
counsel may help the disreputable client in achieving an "undesir-
140. This may be one respect in which Dean Freedman's concerns that the securities bar 
has become the captive of the SEC are particularly evident. See Freedman, supra note 14. 
There can be no doubt but that the concern of the lawyer or the firm over its relationship with 
the SEC has played a substantial part in decisions not to accept clients. 
141. The Securities Subcommittee of the Senate Banking Committee, chaired by Senator 
Harrison Williams, recently commenced an investigation of denial of due process in SEC en-
forcement activities. SEC. REG. & L. REP. {BNA) No. 425 at A-1 (Oct. 26, 1977). 
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able" end, such counsel will dissuade the client from that illicit un-
dertaking or channel the client's efforts along more appropriate 
lines. 
Of course, it may be that both the role of corporations in society 
and the general considerations of due process in the context of eco-
nomic behavior are such that we are no longer concerned with deny-
ing qualified counsel to disreputable corporate clients-although it 
might be noted that qualified counsel are probably less adept at 
achieving socially undesirable goals than unprincipled counsel. But 
if we do desire that even clients of poor reputation have counsel 
available-that is, if we are willing to take the risk that some such 
clients will be helped to «evade" (read: follow too precisely) the law 
in the hope that others will be prompted to mend their ways-two 
things are essential. The first is uniform action. It should be clear 
that for op.e firm today to announce that henceforth it will advise the 
disreputable together with their white-hatted brethren would suc-
ceed only in destroying that firm's reputation. Accordingly, the orga-
nized bar must dictate, and the major law firms must accept, that all 
clients are entitled to representation and that representation should 
not be denied except in the case of conflict or of a representation that 
is actually believed to involve activity that is fraudulent or otherwise 
contrary to law. 
The second requirement is probably beyond the control of any 
organized group other than Congress and the state legislatures, and 
they, in fact, are not likely to act on it. But regardless of that con-
straint, it should be established that lawyers cannot be held liable, 
absent malpractice (with liability only to the client), active participa-
tion, or gross negligence, when they are found in the presence of 
clients who have committed fraud. It may reflect an idealistic view of 
the integrity of the bar, but the author believes, and recognizes it as a 
matter of faith that most lawyers are conscientious and will not 
knowingly countenance fraud. But it is inevitable that, if honest 
counsel make their services available to disreputable clients, they 
will on occasion be found in the middle of wrongful behavior. That 
is the necessary price for the general availability of counsel. It is no 
different in nature and quite possibly less damaging to society than 
the price we pay when a good lawyer wins an acquittal of the crimi-
nal defendant who is in fact guilty. Nobody has yet suggested that 
the criminal lawyer should be held responsible, either legally or mor-
ally, for a subsequent crime by the client. The analogy admittedly is 
imperfect, but the societal questions are comparable. In sum, we 
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should not hesitate to remove counsel's fear of accepting a corporate 
representation. 
2. Acceptance of Limited Engagements 
A comparable question, but one that is far more perplexing, is 
whether the corporate adviser should be prohibited from accepting a 
very limited engagement within a larger transaction. Nothing in the 
Code or tradition suggests that there is a responsibility to do more 
than the client requests, and yet there surely is some point at which it 
is improper to accept a request to perform no investigation and to 
deliver, on an assumed state of facts, an opinion that is essential to a 
larger transaction. But under what circumstances does an investiga-
tive obligation arise for the corporate attorney? The ABA 142 and the 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York143 seem agreed both 
that the lawyer may rely on facts recited by the client unless there is 
reason to suspect their veracity and that the lawyer's obligation is to 
avoid knowingly issuing an opinion to be used in a fraudulent trans-
action. The SEC's view appears to go further. 144 
It would not necessarily be improper to impose broader respon-
sibilities on the lawyer with an ostensibly limited engagement such 
as issuing an opinion necessary to the sale of municipal bonds, or to 
the distribution of tax-shelter securities, or to the private unregis-
tered sale of stock. Nor do any fundamental societal interests appear 
involved other than the obvious ones of cost to the client-which 
may be substantial-and protection of those investors who may con-
strue the opinion as an endorsement by the lawyer. Simple fairness, 
however, requires that both lawyers and clients at least be made 
aware of the extent of the lawyer's obligation to investigate. 
Although most of the attention given this issue, both in the litiga-
tion 145 and in the deliberations of the organized bar, 146 has focused 
upon the issuance of opinions, the real question is somewhat 
broader. At the heart of the matter is whether lawyers ethically may 
accept limited engagements. The specific questions that arise out of 
142. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 335 (1974). 
143. Special Committee on Lawyers' Role in Securities Transactions, Report, 32 REC, 
AssN. B. CITY N.Y. 345 (1977). 
144. See notes 94-96 supra and accompanying text. 
145. See Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Okla. 1976); 
cases cited in note 89 supra. 
146. See ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note 142; Special Co=ittee on 
Lawyers' Role in Securities Transactions, supra note 143. See also Babb, Barnes, Gordon & 
Kjellenberg, Legal Opinions to Third Parties in Corporate Transactions, 32 Bus. LAW, 553 
(1977). 
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that larger inquiry range from whether the adviser may render lim-
ited advice to whether a lawyer may be publicly associated with an 
essential element -of a transaction without being to some degree re-
sponsible for the transaction as a whole. Somewhere in between 
those questions lies the issue of the adviser's obligation to examine 
and pass upon the work of other counsel with greater responsibility 
for the entire transaction. 
To focus better upon the questions raised in this area, let us as-
sume that a tax lawyer (TL) is asked to give tax advice to the general 
partner (GP) of a proposed limited partnership. The more significant 
issues involving the scope of TL's responsibilities might be posed as 
follows: 
1. If the sole function requested of TL is to provide 3:dvice on 
the structure and activities of the partnership that will maximize tax 
advantages to the limited partners, does he under any circumstances 
have an obligation to examine, or at least be sensitive to, the broader 
implications of the transaction as a whole? 
2. Are TL's obligations increased ifhe renders a formal, written 
opinion to GP about tax consequences, assuming that the opinion is 
neither intended to be, nor is, disclosed to any person other than 
GP? 
3. Are his obligations increased if the opinion states that it is for 
GP alone, but its contents are disclosed to the limited partners, as-
suming TL should anticipate such disclosure? 
4. Are his obligations increased if the opinion is addressed to 
and delivered to prospective limited partners? 
5. If, in any of the foregoing situations, it is determined that TL 
has obligations beyond those associated purely with the tax opinion 
or advice, are those obligations reduced, and, if so, to what extent, by 
the presence Qf other counsel with specific responsibility for general 
advice? If TL's obligations are so reduced, does he then have any 
responsibility to satisfy himself as to the competence of such other 
counsel? 
While the hypotheticals sketched above relate to tax advice, it 
should be recognized that substantially similar questions arise with 
respect to bond counsel, 147 counsel issuing the relatively narrow 
"duly and validly issued" opinion required under the Securities 
Act, 148 antitrust counsel, counsel passing on state securities law ques-
147. See SEC, supra note 95, ch. 6. 
148. See note 117 supra. 
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tions, litigation counsel, or counsel in a variety of other situations 
whose duty, as defined by the client, is to some degree limited. 
A sufficiently broad analysis, of course, would dictate that in all 
of the situations identified TL would have a general duty to investi-
gate and to refuse any participation in the transaction if fraud is 
found. In all probability, the partnership could not have been prop-
erly structured without some professional tax guidance, and thus the 
rendering of such assistance could be held to create a broader profes-
sional responsibility for the entire transaction. So broad a standard, 
however, should readily be seen as going too far. The adviser who 
rendered advice about partnership structure is not truly any more 
responsible for GP's activities than the real estate broker who sold 
land to the partnership, the government officer who accepted limited 
partnership articles for filing, or the paper manufacturer on whose 
paper the documents were printed; each of those individuals was 
also an essential link in the chain. Certainly the adviser is a "profes-
sional" and greater responsibilities attach to that position, but those 
responsibilities should not include any generalized duty of investiga-
tion. Rather, regardless of how essential TL's services may have 
been, his affirmative duty to investigate should arise only if there are 
facts clearly putting him on notice of a fraudulent intent. In short, a 
"but for'' test of causation yields irrational results in this context. 
If, then, we reject the kind of analysis that will place investigative 
responsibilities upon the corporate adviser regardless of how limited 
is the nature of his engagement, it remains to be determined at what 
point such responsibilities do arise. An examination of the series of 
roles assumed by TL yields the conclusion that, as his direct involve-
ment becomes successively greater, the reader is less outraged by a 
requirement that our tax adviser accept additional responsibilities. 
In all likelihood the reason for that emotional progression is that 
expressed long ago by Judge Cardozo in the famous Ultramares149 
case-as the series progresses, each case prior to the last yields some 
greater sense that the limited partners may be relying on the· impri-
matur of TL. 
But under what circumstances is a reasonable investor likely to 
place actual reliance on tax counsel to investigate all aspects of a 
transaction or even to be sensitive to the existence of fraud? Suppose, 
for example, that the partnership is a complete fraud, and, though 
TL's tax advice was entirely correct, he failed to detect that GP in-
tended to abscond with the funds rather than invest them. Or sup-
149. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). 
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pose that the property in which the funds were to be invested was 
swampland and that fact was not disclosed. It seems unlikely that 
any reasonable investor would assume that TL _had given any con-
sideration to such matters in preparing an opinion regarding tax con-
sequences. Unless we conclude _that reliance on an investigation 
would be reasonable, we should not impose the investigation as a 
duty. Obviously the suggestion that there is neither reasonable reli-
ance nor professional responsibility is enhanced in the case where 
there is other counsel with responsibility for the entire transaction. 
Two elements of social cost become compelling in the absence of 
a fundamental basis for expanding the responsibilities of the adviser 
hired for a limited purpose. First, there is substantial additional cost 
to the client. Professional legal services are not inexpensive, and pro-
viding an even relatively minor obligation to be particularly sensitive 
to the existence of fraud or nondisclosure will in practice cause ad-
visers to undertake substantial investigation. If there is no persuasive 
reason for imposing such costs, simple notions of efficient allocation 
of capital demand that they be rejected. 
The second element of social cost arises because a move toward 
prohibiting limited engagements involves, in reality, a separation of 
lawyers similar to that existing between accountants who audit pub-
licly held companies and those who do not.150 In that regard, it is 
likely that only the "full service" law firm could render any sort of 
opinion in the investment context. Not only would that appear an 
unnecessary disruption of the profession, it would also, curiously 
enough, be diametrically opposed to the developing tren~ of separat-
ing advocates from advisers. If limited engagements were ethically 
prohibited, no clear distinction would exist between the duty of the 
adviser opining about tax consequences and that of the advocate ad-
vising on pending litigation. And, in an era of increasing legal spe-
cialization, it clearly seems inappropriate to expect the lawyer 
inexperienced in securities matters to be familiar with developing 
notions of securities "fraud" and the requisite elements of disclo-
sure.1s 1 
Without question, it is easy to look only at the hard cases and to 
150. The AICPA is in the process of dividing into two sections, one for those who audit 
publicly held firms and one for those who do not. See Late JJevelopment, J. ACCOUNTANCY, 
Oct. 1977 at 3. That action, however, is currently being challenged in court by several AICPA 
members. See Alam v. AICPA (N.Y. Sup. Ct., filed Jan 6, 1978), Si,c. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 
No. 435 at D-1, complaint dismissed, Wall Street Journal, Aug. 4, 1978, at 4, col. 5 (western 
ed.). 
151. See Jo M. Ferguson, Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 5523 (Aug. 21, 1974) (attor-
ney censured for aiding release of misleading prospectus). 
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assert, with Professor Donahue, 152 that their existence demonstrates 
that the law must be bad. Moreover, as with the question of confi-
dentiality, there will eventually be cases in which lawyers, having 
been permitted to accept limited engagements, will render opinions 
that, although neither incorrect nor improper in themselves, were 
necessary elements in improper schemes. But to prohibit limited en-
gagements or to establish a body of opinion-primarily through con-
sent judgments-suggesting that limitations are not fully valid is a 
step for which no demonstrable need has been shown to exist. 
The foregoing should not be taken to suggest that limited engage-
ments of a vertical nature are proper. While horizontal limitations-
allowing a tax lawyer to practice tax law without worrying about 
general securities disclosure-may be fully appropriate, the tax opin-
ion itself must be competently drafted. It should be clear that the tax 
lawyer has an obligation to review the partnership agreement before 
passing upon it and may not properly issue an opinion on the basis 
of verbal representations about what it contains. And it should be 
equally clear that the tax lawyer has an obligation to make sure, to 
the extent reasonably possible, that any anticipated disclosure of the 
opinion to persons who might rely on it should be complete and ade-
quate. 
Fortunately, although to some degree as a result of cases involv-
ing lawyers as aiders and abettors of securities fraud, the duties of 
lawyers rendering opinions have been adequately explored else-
where.153 It is sufficient here, then, to note that vertical limitations 
on opinions are not proper, that counsel may generally rely upon the 
veracity of.the client, absent contrary indications, on matters of fact, 
and that the opinion, if of such a nature that it likely will be dis-
closed to others, should contain all the assumptions, limitations, and 
conditions upon which it relies. 
C. Confidentiality, Decisionmaking, and Withdrawal 
The earlier portions of this Article were devoted in large measure 
to analyzing the proper role of the corporate legal adviser, with spe-
152. Donahue, Comparative Reflections on the "New Matrimonial Jurisprudence" of the Ro-
man Catholic Church, 75 MICH. L. REV. 994, 1019 (1977). I make public apology to Professor 
Donahue for singling out the one erroneous assertion in an otherwise informative and well-
considered essay. 
153. See ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note 142; Special Committee on 
Lawyers' Role in Securities Transactions, supra note 143; Babb, Barnes, Gordon & Kjel• 
lenbert, supra note 146. See also SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 
1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973); 
Lloyd Feld, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release 11775 (Oct. 30, 1975), 
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cific reference to the confidentiality obligation. However, it is rela-
tively ,clear that, even if the primacy of the coefidentiality norm is 
accepted, it is not an exclusive value. There is a level at which the 
corporate adviser, like the litigator, should properly surrender confi-
dentiality in recognition of more compelling social needs. However, 
the historical determination of that level, as expressed in the Code, is 
not useful in the world of the modem corporate adviser, as evi-
denced by the confusion that presently exists in the area. Further-
more, it is readily apparent that in the context of the adviser's 
activities, the question is seldom as simple as whether another social 
need outweighs confidentiality. In most cases two other aspects of 
the adviser's obligations will simultaneously be at issue: the obliga-
tion to recognize that decisionmaking authority resides in the client 
and the obligation not to withdraw from a representation without 
sufficient cause where to do so would be to the client's disadvantage. 
The ABA-AICPA settlement, discussed earlier in this Article, 154 am-
ply illustrates the need for a more coherent approach to the duties of 
the adviser in this context. That settlement may easily be read as 
imposing greater duties on the corporate adviser than it intends. But 
in the absence of a general statement of when counsel may be re-
quired to resign a representation or to initiate disclosure, it is diffi-
cult for the lawyer who has not reviewed all the related materials, as 
it certainly is for the auditor, to understand just what the language of 
the proposed form of lawyer's response means. 
It is useful for the discussion that follows to attempt to identify 
the social interests involved when the corporate adviser faces an is-
sue raising questions about the extent of the confidentiality obliga-
tion. They are the following: 
1. The interest of society in having available to corporations a rel-
atively detached and professional group of persons to whom disclo-
sures can be made, and from whom advice can be sought, in 
confidence. 
2. The interest of clients and of society in having ultimate deci-
sionmaking authority rest with the client. It is important to recognize 
society's interest in having decisions made by tl_ie persons who will re-
ceive their primary economic benefits or burdens. 
3. The interest of society· in being protected from fraudulent and 
criminal activity. To subordinate this interest to confidentiality is not 
to disregard it, for there will always be some level at which one should 
compel even disclosure of confidences. 
4. The interest of the client in being able to deal with the lawyer 
without undue burden and expense. Specifically, clients should not 
154. See text at notes 61-75 supra. 
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have to worry about whether lawyers will withdraw from representa-
tion without very good reasons. 
5. The interest of the lawyer in being able to withdraw from a 
professionally offensive representation. 
Balancing these varied interests is obviously a difficult endeavor 
even in the context specifically addressed by the present Code. Take 
as an example the seemingly manageable case of the criminal de-
fendant who has threatened murder. It is obvious that the lawyer 
cannot buy a gun for the client. But if the client has sworn that he 
will commit the murder, does the lawyer "assist" in the crime's com-
mission by defending the client vigorously in a pending robbery 
trial? "But for'' such representation, the client would be incarcerated 
and unable to commit the murder. Is the answer different when 
counsel argues for a low bail bond on the robbery charge? And what 
if the client has not sworn to commit the murder, but counsel sus-
pects, without any real evidence, that the client is likely to attempt 
the murder? 
Obviously there must be some limitation on the extent to which 
any such analysis will satisfy our concept of what it means for a law-
yer to "assist" a client. But, just as obviously, the lines are not easily 
drawn. In the environment of the corporate adviser, the inquiries 
become incredibly more complex. The social interest in protecting a 
potential murder victim is considerably clearer than the interest in 
protecting potential fraud victims; while both certainly deserve pro-
tection, the substantially greater penalties for murder indicate soci-
ety's evaluation of the relative harms involved. Furthermore, what 
constitutes "fraud" in the modem corporate arena is not at all 
clear-the concept goes far beyond a taking by deception. Thus, 
when the criminal lawyer's client threatens murder, there is a clear 
crime involved, but when the corporate adviser's client proposes a 
course of conduct, there may be substantial doubt about whether it is 
illegal. On the other hand, the nature of the adviser's activities may 
be viewed as less critical to society, and certainly less critical to the 
judicial system, than those of criminal defense counsel. 
The task that must be performed is to determine when the coun-
tervailing social interests are sufficiently compelling that we would 
move away from the general obligation not to disclose confidential 
information and not to withdraw from a representation. In making 
that evaluation we must recognize that, in requiring counsel to with-
draw from a representation, we are likely sacrificing the social inter-
est in leaving the locus of decisionmaking authority at the client 
level. In most such situations, the adviser's statement that he will be 
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compelled to resign as counsel will , cause the client to accede to 
counsel's wishes. If we require a disclosure of a client confidence, we 
are almost certainly accomplishing that shift of authority and are 
also sacrificing the general interest in confidentiality. We should not 
undertake such sacrifice without good cause. Determining when that 
cause exists, however, is no simple matter. 
We are dealing with two variables: the level of lawyer participa-
tion in the activity and the extent of the social harm involved in the 
activity. The first of those, the extent of counsel's participation, is 
itself comprised of two other variables-the nature of the lawyer's 
participation in the client's actions and the clearness with which 
those actions are wrongful. Suppose, for example, that a client cor-
poration wishes to purchase shares of its own common stock in 
transactions on the stock exchange, and there exists a difficult tech-
nical question about the propriety of the transaction under rule lOb-
6. Suppose further that after a thorough review of the law, counsel 
advises that it is an extremely close question and that there is no 
precedent, but that counsel expects ·a court would find the transac-
tion to constitute a violation of the rule. If the client then decides to 
go ahead with the transaction, it would appear improper to conclude 
that counsel would be participating in a fraud by drafting necessary 
documents, thereby generating a wlthdrawal or disclosure obliga-
tion, even though a violation of rule l0b-6 is a fraud. Before sacrific-
ing society's interest in having decisions made by clients, we should 
require at a minimum that -counsel be reasonably sure that the pro-
posed activity is, in fact, fraudulent or illegal. Similarly, if the discus-
sion between client and counsel took place over-dinner and the client 
then by itself consummated the transaction without giving the ad-
viser the opportunity to research the matter, the limited involvement 
of counsel in the transaction should cause us not to give counsel af-
firmative obligations to protect the public. 
With respect to the social harm involved, it should be clear that 
we should not sacrifice the general role of the corporate adviser un-
less a meaningful social harm is anticipated. The variety of activities 
that may constitute crimes, or be included within definitions of 
fraud, in the modem regulatory framework is simply too great for us 
to be satisfied that every such activity represents a sufficiently com-
pelling social interest to cause us to disregard the adviser's general 
obligations. For example, section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 gen-
erally requires that an offering of securities be registered; failure to 
do so is a crime. But in a given case, where there is substantial public 
information about a corporation and registration would be little 
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more than a formality, it is not at all clear that a client's intention to 
make a relatively small sale without registration should cause coun-
sel to have an obligation to disclose the client's intended crime. 
The interest-balancing task requires that we recognize all of these 
variables. When there is relatively little involvement of the adviser in 
an improper activity, either because the involvement is slight or the 
impropriety is unclear, and the social harm is not perceived as sub-
stantial, the adviser should be permitted to resign, but only if to do 
so will not operate to the disadvantage of the client. As the involve-
ment and the perceived social harm become greater, withdrawal 
should become mandatory. When the involvement is substantial and 
the social harm grave, an obligation of public disclosure, aban-
doning confidentiality, might properly be imposed. 
Admittedly such an approach needs further definition, and sub-
stantial judgment on the part of the individual adviser will always be 
required. But simpler approaches, such as the traditional view em-
bodied in the present Code, have only the appearance, and not the 
substance, of greater clarity. 
D. Avoidance of Conflicting Roles 
The Code of Professional Advisorial Responsibility should re-
solve authoritatively the propriety of the adviser serving as a direc-
tor, or being a shareholder, of the publicly held client. While both of 
these matters have received some attention, they have provoked curi-
ously little discussion in the literature. Certainly there can be no 
doubt about their importance. Indeed, one might say that much of 
the trouble besetting the corporate adviser today is attributable to 
the presence of a lawyer on the board of directors of BarChris Con-
struction Corp.155 
Representation on a corporate board is clearly the more signifi-
cant of the questions. And, although several major law firms con-
tinue to have partners serving on the boards of their clients,156 no 
legitimate basis exists for allowing the practice to continue. Setting 
aside considerations that should directly affect the law firms, such as 
whether they have deputized partners who sit as directors, 157 the cor-
155. See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Recently the 
Chairman of the SEC did suggest the impropriety of directorships for outside counsel, as well 
as for bankers and members of management other than the chief executive. Address by Harold 
Williams, Corporate Accountability, delivered at the Fifth Annual Securities Regulation Insti-
tute, Jan. 18, 1978. 
156. See w. HUDSON, OUTSIDE COUNSEL: INSIDE DIRECTOR (1973). 
157. Cf. Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969) (because corporation 
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poration gains no perceivable benefit by having its counsel sit on its 
board. The practice does, perhaps, enable the corporation to an-
nounce to the world that a reputed firm is willing to have a partner 
on its board, but, besides creating risks for t_he law firm, 158 that sort 
of advertisement is certainly antithetical to the notion, endorsed 
herein, that all clients should have available to them counsel of re-
pute. Furthermore, though it could be argued that the value to the 
corporation of its counsel's advice at board meetings is significant, 
that advice is available regardless of whether counsel is present as a 
director. 
In sum, then, the benefits of permitting corporate counsel to 
serve as a director are, at most, minimal. While that might be suffi-
cient if no substantial costs wer.e present, such is not the case. If it is 
accepted that counsel should defer to the board as the voice of the 
entity, how can counsel constitute a part of that voice? Beyond that, 
if counsel's role is properly one of advising the entity how best to 
meet its goals, is it not an irreconcilable role conflict for counsel also 
to have the director's obligation of gauging the propriety of these 
goals? More broadly, regardless of whether we assign directors the 
"managerial" or the "monitoring" function, 159 their role will differ 
necessarily from that which the corporate adviser will fill. And the 
same conflict exists whether a single person serves both roles or one 
person is in one role and his partner in the other. While the two roles 
often may not be directly adverse, they are also seldom identical, and 
to allow one to be influenced by the other is simply unprofessional. 
Moreover, on a purely pragmatic level, management asking a 
corporate adviser to serve on the board is often not expecting that 
counsel will fulfill the duties of a director. Rather, management fre-
quently views counsel as another "inside" director with an appear-
ance of being independent. That is, management is pleased to list 
counsel as not being an employee or any sort of affiliate, but it views 
him as an essentially captive director whose vote is reliably pro-man-
agement except, perhaps, in extreme cases. Clearly, that view of the 
president was on plaintiffs' board of directors, corporation was held to be a director and thus 
liable to plaintiff for short-swing profits). 
158. Cf. Black & Co. v. Nova-Tech, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 468 (D. Ore. 1971), in which pres-
ence of California counsel's name on an annual report circulated within Oregon was held 
sufficient to give Oregon courts jurisdiction of a claim against counsel related to the corpora-
tion's alleged securities law violations. 
159. See N. LEECH & R. MUNDHEIM, THE OUTSIDE DIRECTOR OF THE PUBLIC CORPORA-
TION (1976). Cf. Securities Exchange Act Release 13482 (Apr. 28, 1977) (requesting public 
co=ent on this issue). 
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director's function is inappropriate and should not be condoned by 
the bar. 
Much of this analysis may seem purely speculative. How likely is 
it that a conflict actually will arise? Does not the fact that the prac-
tice has at least the implicit approval of some major law firms entitle 
it to a certain presumption of regularity? The difficulty with that 
view is that conflicts can arise, that the adviser-director may be less 
apt to perceive them, and that if such conflicts do arise, the adviser 
who sits on the board may not easily be able to extricate himself. As 
a consequence, it seems to be one of those situations where an ounce 
of prevention should be a mandatory professional responsibility. 
Consider, for example, the statutory procedures established in 
the Securities Act of 1933 for directors who are concerned about a 
disclosure in a prospectus. Sections 1 l(b)(l) and (2) provide that a 
director may escape the very substantial liability provisions gener-
ally applicable when a prospectus is inaccurate or incomplete only if 
the director resigns and "advise[s] the Commission and the issuer in 
writing that he [has) taken such action and that he would not be 
responsible for such part of the registration statement." Even if the 
conclusions reached by this Article about the importance of confi-
dentiality are not accepted, it is not likely that the threshhold level at 
which a disclosure obligation would arise for the corporate adviser 
would be the same as for the director who sought to follow the resign 
and disclose procedure. Thus the resign and disclose procedure, 
which, inter a/ia, is a statutory means of helping directors to force 
disclosure, could be hampered by lawyers' concerns with confidenti-
ality obligations. While that conflict becomes increasingly tense as 
greater acceptance is given to the ethical obligation of confidential-
ity, it remains substantial at every level. 
Nor is the conflict limited to the statutory framework of the Se-
curities Act registration process. A director should be free at any 
time to dissent and to demand that the dissent be publicly known. 
The lawyer, however, does not have that freedom, and is in fact 
duty-bound to assist the client in accomplishing legally permissible 
ends. Assuming a business judgment disagreement with no hint of 
illegality or impropriety, the lawyer's traditional obligation to assist 
the client is clearly at odds with the director's right, and perhaps 
obligation, to make known the reasons for the business disagree-
ment.160 
160. See also Report of Investigation in the Matter of National Tel. Co., Inc., Relating to 
Activities of the Outside Directors of National Tel. Co., Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release 
January 1978) Public Interest and Professional Ethics 493 
Why, then, does it remain true that partners of major law firms 
continue to serve as directors of client corporations? The reasons 
vary, and, though all of them are understandable, none of them are 
compelling. Perhaps the greatest reasons are those arising from the 
not unrelated interests of self-esteem and personal income. Without 
doubt, there is a substantial sense of self-worth associated with being 
asked to serve a client as a director. In some ways, it may be seen as 
a form of appreciation far beyond the payment of fees. A pertinent 
part of this consideration is the corporate adviser's personal relation-
ship with the client's management. Once the client has asked, declin-
ing to join the board for whatever reason is likely to be perceived ~s 
a rebuff. Understandably, declining the invitation is not a comfort-
able thing to do, and it is potentially harmful to the human relation-
ships involved. 
The other primary reason for joining the board-the economic 
reason-is as understandable as the personal motive. The client on 
whose board the lawyer sits is less likely to cease being a client. 
From a slightly different viewpoint, if the client wants a lawyer on its 
board and another lawyer is available, allowing that lawyer to take 
the position provides him with an edge in the competition for the 
client's business. 
While neither of those rationales is professionally acceptable, 
they both indicate the need for setting forth as a clear standard of 
professional responsibility the impropriety of sitting on a client's 
board of directors. With respect to the lawyer's personal motivations, 
it is important to provide an explicit restraint on the adviser's ego 
and a clear source by which to explain to the client the impropriety 
of the request. For similar reasons, it is important that the client not 
view the declination as inconsistent with generally accepted proce-
dures. In relation to the economic incentives, it is important at least 
to reduce the possibility that the proffered board seat will be given to 
a law firm that will thereafter be able to be a competitor. 
It is not, however, necessary to proscribe any representation of a 
corporation on whose board a lawyer, or a member of a lawyer's 
firm, sits. Certainly a general representation should be barred for the 
reasons elucidated above. But it is by no means clear that a lawyer's 
service on a board would preclude representation in patent matters, 
some types of tax advice, some litigation matters, and the like. And 
to the extent that some limited representation is inoffensive, there 
14380 (Jan. 16, 1978), (1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 81,410, indicat-
ing general directors' disclosure obligation. 
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would seem no reason either to deprive corporations of such services 
from law firms represented on their boards, or to· force all lawyers to 
decide at the outset between acceptance of a tendered board position 
and some future limited representation. 
Precise lines cannot be drawn on which sorts of limited represen-
tation might be acceptable. Clearly, however, the proper view of an 
advisory code should be that no lawyer should accept the general 
representation of a client while serving on its board, but that a repre-
sentation of limited scope and duration may be accepted if there is 
no reasonable expectation that a conflict exists or will develop be-
tween the individuar s obligations as a director and those pertinent to 
behavior as a lawyer. 
The matter of share ownership is less important, but still worthy 
of attention. Except in unusual circumstances-primarily where a 
client's only feasible means of paying for legal services is through the 
issuance of equity-there is no client benefit from share ownership 
by counsel. On the other hand, corporate counsel's ownership of 
stock creates both a temptation for insider trading161 and a clear con-
flict, since shareholder interests are not those of the entity and are 
even further removed from it than those of directors. Acquisition of 
a client's securities should therefore be prohibited. 162 At the same 
tin_ie, dispositi~n of an existing interest in a corporation that becomes 
a client, particularly if the representation is of a limited nature, 
should not necessarily be required; indeed, rule lOb-5 may prohibit 
such a sale, depending on the matter for which the lawyer was re-
tained. 
The problem of whether advisers may serve as directors or share-
holders provides a typical example of the flaws in the present Code 
to which this Article has been addressed. Over the years, commenc-
ing with Judge Sharswood's analysis, there has been substantial 
thought given to the propriety of various relationships between the 
litigating attorney and his client. Whether contingent fees are per-
161. The SEC has issued a caution about such matters. See Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 Release No. 13437 (Apr. 8, 1977), [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC, L. REP. (CCH) 
~ 81,116. 
162, The directive of Guide 56 of the SEC's Guides for Preparation and Filing of Registra-
tion Statements Under the Securities Act of 1933, published in various Securities Act releases 
commencing with Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 4936 (Dec. 9, 1968), that counsel disclose 
in a prospectus any interest of counsel in the issuer (with some specified exceptions) is obvi-
ously a recognition of potential conflict that, for securities law purposes, is curable through 
disclosure. For purposes of determining proper behavior, it might well be that such disclosure 
is insufficient, since the concern is not with what the investing public may expect, but with 
counsel's ability to give disinterested advice. See also Lefkowitz, The Allorney-C/ient Relation-
ship and the Corporation, 26 REC. AssN. B. CITY N.Y. 697 (1971). 
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missible, whether costs of suit may be advanced, whether one who 
will be a witness may undertake a representation, and other ques-
tions have been the subject of great and continuous debate. But simi-
lar questions surrounding the limitations on the adviser's 
involvement with the corporate client have been virtually ignored. 
That realization alone should provide evidence enough of the need 
to consider and adopt a Code of Professfonal Advisorial Responsi-
bility. 
VI. CONCLUSION: THE MECHANICS OF DECISION 
AND IMPLEMENTATION 
Viewed as a trend, the recent developments indicating a changing 
role for the corporate legal adviser portend, if they continue without 
full, organized review, nothing less than disaster. Moreover, the 
changes that need to be made are not readily susceptible to the evo-
lutionary process of the common law. We need, rather, to decide 
consciously whether we, as a society, want the lawyer in the corpo-
rate setting to be receptive to confidential information. We need to 
determine-with an awareness of history, though not an unyielding 
commitment to it-whether the lawyer is to serve the client or the 
broader public interest. While the proper choice seems clear to me, 
the existence of a contrary trend indicates that there are opposing 
views and, perhaps as well, that society does not fully understand the 
direction in which recent developments have headed. 
But whether my view or the contrary view is accepted may be less 
important than that society act to implement one or the other. The 
current situation benefits no group. How, then, do we make the 
choice, and how do we effect it? One possibility, of course, is Con-
gress, which already is moving toward greater involvement in the 
accounting profession. 163 Recent history suggests that when account-
ants are being challenged, lawyers cannot be far behind. As a mem-
ber of ·the profession that would thereby be subject to federal 
regulation, I am, with admitted bias, loath even to mention it, but it 
remains a possibility. 
The only apparent alternative is through the auspices of the 
ABA, and that could be accomplished sensibly only through a com-
163. See Accountants Plan Key Changes in Section far Firms Auditing Publicly Held Firms, 
Wall St. J., March 7, 1978, at 110, col. 2; 17ze CPAs Are Trying To Outrace Congress, Bus. 
Week., Sept 26, 1977, at 58-59; Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Reports, Ac-
counting, and Management, Report on Improving the Accountability of Publicly-Owned Cor-
porations and Their Auditors (1977), reprinted in SEC. REG. L. REP. (BNA) No. 428, at H-
1-H-8 (1977). 
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mittee of lawyers, clients, public representatives, regulators, and ac-
countants, all of the highest calibre, which is given substantial 
autonomy from the ABA itself. The issues are simply too important 
and too close to the legal profession to leave available the challenge 
that conclusions were reached by lawyers for lawyers, mindless of 
the public interest. 164 If such a committee is established, implemen-
tation of its conclusions could be accomplished within the ABA, with 
continued, but reduced, external involvement. 
Once the role of the corporate legal adviser is established, sub-
stantial effort will be required to provide the lawyer with criteria by 
which to govern his conduct. Indeed, it would be appropriate, and 
not likely a waste of time, immediately to begin the development of a 
Code of Professional Advisorial Responsibility based on the assump-
tion that the historical role of the corporate lawyer will, as it should, 
be retained. While such a Code might not govern the SEC, 165 Con-
gress' clear denial of any right in the Commission to establish admis-
sion standards for its bar, 166 and the SEC's deference to state law in 
this regard, 167 strongly suggest that if the SEC does not willingly ac-
cept such standards, the courts should. 
It is all too clear that the conflicting demands currently placed on 
lawyers are no more healthy for society than for the legal profession. 
The time for their resolution, if it has not passed, is most assuredly at 
hand. 
164. See Morgan, supra note 13, at 704: "The analysis will suggest that lawyers' ethics are 
consistently self-serving . . . ." 
Again, the procedures being implemented by the accounting profession provide an instruc-
tive example; the AICPA is in the process of forming a public oversight board, composed of 
persons who are not primarily accountants, to review its practices from a broader perspective. 
See A Wider Look at What CPA's .Do, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 30, 1978, at 71. 
165. The Code is not formally binding except where it is adopted bylaw. Since 5 U.S.C. § 
500 (1976) precludes the SEC from establishing minimum standards for practice before it, 
there may be some question whether the SEC could "adopt" the Code. Proceedings brought 
by the SEC under rule 2(e) of its Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1977), make clear that 
in disciplinary proceedings the SEC does not view itself as bound by the law or standards of 
the state in which the practitioner is licensed to practice. See cases cited at note 77 supra. 
166. See note 88 supra. 
167. Rule 2(b) of the SEC's Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(b) (1977), provides that 
"[a] person may be represented in any proceeding by an attorney at law admitted to practice 
before the Supreme Court of the United States, or the highest court of any State or Territory of 
the United States, or the Court of Appeals or the District Court of the United States for the 
District of Columbia." 
